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When we speak of the “Enlightenment,” those of us who are not
Buddhists commonly refer to a complex movement of thought, culture,
temperament, and politics represented in its early phases by thinkers like
Descartes and Locke, and in its later phases by figures like Kant or, in
America, Jefferson and Paine. This self-styled “Age of Reason,” or
what we might call the “historical” or “classical” Enlightenment, is often
said to have succumbed in the nineteenth century to the forces of
reaction and romanticism. But the Enlightenment is also invoked, most
often by or on behalf of modern liberal political and constitutional
theorists,1 to designate a sort of political-moral ideal that ostensibly has
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I thank
Larry Alexander, Curt Bradley, Rick Garnett, Vittorio Hosle, Andy Koppleman, Bob
Nagel, Michael Perry, Stephen Presser, George Rutherglen, Philip Quinn, George
Wright, and Michael Zuckert for helpful comments on earlier drafts. A slightly different
version of this Article was presented at a conference on “America and the Enlightenment:
Constitutionalism in the 21st Century” in November 2001 in London, sponsored by the
Institute of United States Studies, University of London.
1. Indeed, liberalism and Enlightenment are sometimes conflated. See, e.g.,
Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE
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guided and continues to guide American constitutionalism. This more
modern iteration is supposed to be connected to the historical
Enlightenment, it seems, mainly on the basis of a professed allegiance to
governance by “reason.”
In this essay I will argue that although there are indeed continuities
between the classical Enlightenment and “the spirit of the
Enlightenment”2 that animates contemporary thinkers, these continuities
are partly cosmetic and in any case are overwhelmed by the
discrepancies. The modern Enlightenment orientation reflected in
liberal political and constitutional theorizing is more accurately
understood as an inversion than as an extension of the most essential
ideals of the Enlightenment commitments to liberty, equality, freedom of
conscience, and freedom of speech—commitments that today are
endlessly elaborated but largely undefended and that consequently seem
fragile. So those who would maintain these historic commitments might
naturally wish for a recovery of the ideals and assumptions of the
classical Enlightenment. And the formidable (and for the moment, I
fear, insuperable) obstacle to any such recovery is . . . the modern
Enlightenment.
I. THE CLASSICAL ENLIGHTENMENT
The historical Enlightenment was, as Roy Porter notes, “necessarily
rather amorphous and diverse,”3 and any brief (or, for that matter, long)
description of it will thus reflect a selective interpretation. With that
caveat, I suggest that for present purposes the classical Enlightenment
can be understood in terms of several components that were, in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nicely harmonious.
The commitment to truth. In his Discourse on Method, Descartes
reports that he had “always had an especially great desire to learn to
distinguish the true from the false.”4 And he immediately explains the
practical thrust of this desire: he wanted truth, he says, “in order to see
my way clearly in my actions, and to go forward with confidence in this
L.J. 929, 937 (1986) (referring to “the Liberal Enlightenment faith founded by Adam
Smith and James Madison”). And thinkers tending to the “liberal center” seem more
inclined to invoke the Enlightenment than do those either to the left or the right of that
position. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453, 453 (1996)
(associating the Constitution with Enlightenment reason, and arguing that this centrist
position is under attack from both “the left and the right”).
2. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 159–60 (1991).
3. ROY PORTER, THE ENLIGHTENMENT 9 (2d ed. 2001).
4. RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST
PHILOSOPHY 6 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Publ’g. Co. 4th ed. 1998).

1264

SMITH S..DOC

[VOL. 41: 1263, 2004]

8/22/2019 1:27 PM

Recovering (From) Enlightenment?
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

life.”5 Descartes’s report captures an essential impulse that drove the
Enlightenment: a compulsion both to know truth and to live by it.
Vocabulary varied, to be sure. Terms like “reason” and the “life of
reason” incorporated this imperative.6 And instead of the diction of
living according to “truth,” the classical Enlightenment often favored the
vocabulary of living in accordance with “nature,”7—as in the
Declaration of Independence’s invocation of “nature and nature’s God.”8
The idea was not novel, of course—“You shall know the truth, and the
truth shall make you free” had been said before—but it was nonetheless
fundamental to the project of the classical Enlightenment.
Reason, nature, and truth were guiding precepts for the framers of the
American Constitution, or so they declared; their intention was to build a
new constitutional order on the basis of the truths of human nature and
the best political science, which they saw as revealing truths about
government that had previously been obscure.9 Tocqueville noticed this
aspect of the founding: in an encomium to the framers of the
Constitution, he emphasized that “[t]hey had the courage to say what
they believed to be true . . . .”10 Moreover, in this respect, the framers
were following the example of the signatories of the Declaration of
Independence—a document that explicitly manifested the commitment
to living by truth. In declaring their intention to engage in a bloody
conflict to break political bonds established over centuries, the American
founders had insisted that they were acting not merely from self-interest,
but rather on the basis of fundamental and self-evident truths; and in
5. Id.
6. In this vein, Nicholas Wolterstorff notes that according to Locke, “to be human
is to have Reason speaking within one. It is this that sets us off from the ‘brutes’ . . . .”
Reason, in Locke’s understanding, is an epistemic faculty, but it is much more than that:
it is an ethical ideal. “Reason is to be our guide.” NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JOHN
LOCKE AND THE ETHICS OF BELIEF 86–87 (1996).
7. See CARL L. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
PHILOSOPHERS 47–51 (1932); see id. at 51 (“Nature and natural law—what magic these
words held for the philosophical century!”).
8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
9. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton); cf. Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 531 n.13 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (describing the
“Framers of our Constitution” as “products of the Age of Enlightenment”). For a more
extensive discussion of how the framers saw the Constitution as an unprecedented
manifestation of reason, see STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION & THE PRIDE OF
REASON 3–4, 31–47 (1998) [hereinafter SMITH, REASON].
10. Quoted in HENRY F. MAY, THE DIVIDED HEART: ESSAYS ON PROTESTANTISM
AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA 159 (1991) [hereinafter MAY, DIVIDED HEART].
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what was more than a dramatic gesture11 they had staked on those truths
their “lives,” their “fortunes,” and their “sacred honor.”
Lincoln called attention to this truth-oriented dimension of the
founding when he observed, in the Gettysburg Address, that the
American republic was founded on a “proposition.”12 Almost a century
later, John Courtney Murray eloquently made the point: what he called
the “American Proposition”
rests on the . . . conviction that there are truths; that they can be known; that
they must be held; for, if they are not held, assented to, consented to, worked
into the texture of institutions, there can be no hope of founding a true City, in
which men may dwell in dignity, peace, unity, justice, well-being, freedom.13

A commitment to living in accordance with truth presupposes, of
course, that there is in fact a truth of the sort that prescribes how to live,
and how to live together—hence, a moral and political truth. Modern
thinkers occasionally distinguish this sort of overarching truth from the
mundane facts or merely pragmatic propositions that pervade everyday
life by capitalizing the word (often with a derisive tone).14 So we could
say that at the heart of the classical Enlightenment was a belief in, and a
resolve to live by, the Truth.
Reason versus culture. The commitment to living by the Truth
entailed, for the Enlightenment, the exercise of reason; and reason in
turn implied an effort to break free of the impediments and errors of
culture and tradition.15 Indeed, reliance on received opinions embodied
in culture was taken to be the opposite of reason; the whole point of
reason was to free persons from the moral and epistemic corruption that
11. Cf. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS 5 (2000):
Based on what we now know about the military history of the American
Revolution, if the British commanders had prosecuted the war more vigorously
in its earliest stages, the Continental Army might very well have been
destroyed at the start and the movement for American independence nipped in
the bud. The signers of the Declaration would then have been hunted down,
tried, and executed for treason . . . .
12. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in CARL F. WIECK,
LINCOLN’S QUEST FOR EQUALITY 145–46 (2002).
13. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION ix (1960).
14. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 1, at 937 (describing people who believe they
have discovered “the Truth about Jesus”). Richard Rorty explains that “[u]ncapitalized,
‘truth’ and ‘goodness’ name properties of sentences, or of actions and situations.
Capitalized, they are the proper names of objects—goals or standards which can be loved
with all one’s heart and soul and mind, objects of ultimate concern.” RICHARD RORTY,
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM xiv (1982).
15. Cf. Donald W. Livingston, The Founding and the Enlightenment: Two
Theories of Sovereignty, in VITAL REMNANTS: AMERICA’S FOUNDING AND THE WESTERN
TRADITION 243, 244 (Gary L. Gregg II ed., 1999) (“[R]eason is conceived as being
independent of tradition. Tradition is the great horror of the Enlightenment . . . .”).
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pervades culture and received tradition. Thus, Kant famously answered
the question, “What is enlightenment?” by explaining that it means
thinking for oneself, and that an “inability to make use of one’s own
understanding without the guidance of another” is a form of
“immaturity” reflective of “[l]aziness and cowardice.”16 The modern
rationalist stance, Ernest Gellner explains, is “a programme for man’s
liberation from culture.”17
The seminal example, once again, was set by Descartes, for whom
reasoning entailed a resolution to “get rid of [all received judgments and
opinions] once and for all” in order to start from scratch in developing
reliable knowledge.18 “[I]n truly rationalist spirit,” Gellner observes,
Descartes “decided to declare independence of the accidental assemblage of
beliefs, of all cultural accretion, and to set out independently on a reexploration of the world.”19 Later Enlightenment thinkers drastically
revised the details of the Cartesian program, but “the spirit of the inquiry
and its implicit terms of reference remained much as Descartes had
formulated them.”20 Thus, modern Enlightenment reason amounts to a
“culture-defying individualism, a Robinson Crusoe posture.”21
From our perspective, to be sure, this setting of reason in opposition to
culture might seem misguided. A theme running through twentiethcentury philosophy and associated with diverse thinkers such as
Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Rorty, holds that reason is inevitably
embedded in culture, or “forms of life.” We always and necessarily
think and talk from within a language, an intellectual tradition, a
16. See generally Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is
Enlightenment?, reprinted in WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT? EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
ANSWERS AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY QUESTIONS 58 (James Schmidt ed., 1996).
17. ERNEST GELLNER, REASON AND CULTURE 13 (1992).
18. See DESCARTES, supra note 4, at 8:
[A]s regards all the opinions to which I had until now given credence, I could
not do better than to try to get rid of them once and for all, in order to replace
them later on, either with other ones that are better, or even with the same ones
once I had reconciled them to the norms of reason. And I firmly believed that
by this means I would succeed in conducting my life much better than if I were
to build only upon old foundations . . . .
19. GELLNER, supra note 17, at 18.
20. Id. at 13.
21. Id. at 14; see also STEPHEN TOULMIN, COSMOPOLIS: THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF
MODERNITY 175 (1990) (“[T]he idea of ‘starting again with a clean slate’ has been as
recurrent a preoccupation of modern European thinkers as the quest for certainty itself.
The belief [is] that any new construction is truly rational only if it demolishes all that
was there before and starts from scratch . . . .”).
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“paradigm”—from within a culture. So the effort to detach reason from
culture may seem akin to an attempt to separate speech from language or
music from sound.22 Though a strong proponent of Enlightenment
reason, Gellner admits as much: it was never possible, he says, to detach
reason from culture, as Descartes and his successors wanted to do. So
what actually resulted was simply a different kind of culture—a
rationalist culture.23
The Enlightenment’s apparent naivete on this point is accentuated, it
may seem, by the embarrassing fact that Enlightenment thinkers came
nowhere near agreement about exactly what reason is, or how it works.
Empirically-minded thinkers such as Locke criticized the epistemology
of rationalists such as Descartes and were in turn criticized by idealists
like Berkeley and by more skeptical thinkers such as Hume. Gellner’s
study describes the large differences in what modern thinkers associated
with or influenced by the Enlightenment have taken reason to be. Given
this diversity, a cynic might be excused for concluding that the
Enlightenment is defined by an exuberant common commitment to . . . a
word, nothing more.
So, was the Enlightenment the child of a rash misconception?
Perhaps. There is no use denying that the luminaries of the Age of
Reason were, as James Whitman observes, “fallible, and often comically
fallible, human beings.”24 They may have been guilty of massive selfdeception, as Carl Becker’s classic study wittily argued.25 Still, there is
a more charitable interpretation that depicts the Enlightenment
conception of reason in a more sympathetic way. We might understand
the Cartesian distinction between reason and culture, that is, in less
overtly philosophical and also less absolute terms. The determination to
liberate reason from culture might be seen not as a misguided attempt to
leave culture behind altogether, like a spaceship leaving the planet for
the outer reaches of the cosmos, but rather as an effort to get beyond or
behind particular aspects of a particular culture that are seen to be
decadent, exhausted, or inauthentic.
Even this more modest sort of effort may still be misguided or unduly
optimistic, of course, but it is one we can surely sympathize with, at least
22. Cf. TOULMIN, supra note 21, at 178 (“The belief that, by cutting ourselves off
from the inherited ideas of our cultures, we can ‘clean the slate’ and make a fresh start, is
as illusory as the hope for a comprehensive system of theory that is capable of giving us
timeless certainty and coherence.”).
23. “We are not free of culture, of Custom and Example: but it is of the essence of
our culture that it is rooted in the rationalist aspirations.” GELLNER, supra note 17, at
159.
24. James Q. Whitman, Reason or Hermeticism?: A Comment, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 193, 195 (1997).
25. See BECKER, supra note 7.
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in the abstract. The phenomenon appears repeatedly throughout history.
A culture or tradition or body of conventions comes to seem (to a few,
perhaps not to most participants) empty, pointless, dead—little more
than a burly corpse made up of inherited behaviors and rote questions
and responses that can no longer elicit genuine belief or commitment. A
form of discourse seems to be “just words.” In this mood, Socrates
ponders the moral discourse being practiced by his fellow Greeks and
concludes that even though his neighbors seem satisfied with their ways
of talking, for anyone who pays close attention, the discourse leads only
to confusion, or aporia. His interlocutors are “playing with words but
revealing nothing.”26 Or a loose group of self-styled “legal realists”
considers the “formalist” arguments that their contemporaries are
engaged in and finds it hard to fathom how anyone could suppose that
this form of argumentation actually produces satisfactory answers to
legal disputes. The standard law talk, it seems to the realists, “is in
terms of words; it centers on words; it has the utmost difficulty in getting
beyond words.”27 Or, it is “transcendental nonsense.”28
In such situations, it is natural to try to escape the corrupt conventions
or dissolute discourse and to discover or recover something more solid—
to find or return to “first principles.” Thus, Jesus urges his followers to
forsake artificial traditions in favor of the more fundamental injunctions
to love God and neighbor.29 The Protestant reformers rebel against what
they believe to be decadent Christian traditions in an effort to return to
primitive Christianity; their own descendants repeatedly undertake the
same quest. Emerson and Thoreau inveigh against tradition and
convention and in favor of “nature” and a romantically conceived
“reason.” Legal realists and their successors deconstruct formalist legal
reasoning and advocate its replacement by something they suppose to be
more real and solid—“policy science,” perhaps. The basic phenomenon
is familiar enough: the disaffected come to believe that a particular
culture or discourse has become empty or inauthentic, and they
determine to find or return to something more solid.
More solid or, we might better say, more true: it is imperative to
26. Plato, Gorgias 489e, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 272 (Edith
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
27. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431, 443 (1930).
28. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
29. Mark 7:1–16, 12:28–34.
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remember that Enlightenment reason grows out of a commitment to
live by the truth. At the core of the classical Enlightenment was a
sense—whether it was correct we need not say—that the scholastic
philosophy and religious culture inherited from the Middle Ages and the
more unsettled intellectual culture of early modernity were not based on
or oriented to truth.30 So eighteenth-century thinkers “made a great
point of having renounced the superstition and hocus-pocus of medieval
Christian thought.”31 And reason expressed their attempt to base their
personal and collective lives on the truth—through more careful
reflection, as with Descartes, or through the developing methods of
science advocated by Bacon and practiced with notable success by
Galileo and Newton.
Stephen Toulmin’s interpretation elaborates on this suggestion. In the
aftermath of the breakup of Christendom, Toulmin suggests, thinkers
like Montaigne had developed a modestly skeptical orientation that was
vaguely Christian and broadly humanistic.32 This late sixteenth-century
intellectual style had exhibited a “readiness to live with uncertainty,
ambiguity, and differences of opinion” and, yes, a certain amount of
“higgledy-piggledy confusion.”33 Toulmin himself finds this mindset alluring,
and indeed urges a return to it.34 But he reports that seventeenth-century
thinkers like Descartes found this complacent, moderately skeptical
attitude unendurable.35 Their dissatisfaction expressed more than personal
predilections: to people like Descartes or John Donne, the embrace of
uncertainty and ambiguity seemed to be producing social chaos—“‘Tis
all in pieces, all cohaerance gone”36—and despite its own easygoing
tolerance, the sixteenth-century humanist stance appeared powerless to
end the religious strife that seemed to be devouring Europe.37 In short,
Europe was suffering from a “crisis of belief”38—a crisis with disastrous
practical consequences. In this context, Descartes’s “reflections opened
up for people in his generation a real hope of reasoning their way out of
political and theological chaos, at a time when no one else saw anything
to do but continue fighting an interminable war.”39
30. BECKER, supra note 7, at 29–30.
31. Id. at 29.
32. TOULMIN, supra note 21, at 22–30.
33. Id. at 55, 27.
34. Id. at 198–201.
35. Id. at 62.
36. Id. at 65. This line from Donne, quoted by Toulmin, is strikingly similar to a
line from Yeats’ poem, The Second Coming, that is a modern favorite: “Things fall apart;
the centre cannot hold.”
37. Id. at 65–66, 45–56, 69–71.
38. Id. at 45.
39. Id. at 71; see also id. at 70 (“The 17th-century philosophers’ ‘Quest for
Certainty’ was no mere proposal to construct abstract and timeless intellectual schemas,
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Thus interpreted, the Enlightenment separation of reason from culture
was not necessarily a childish misconception, but rather an effort in
improvement and renewal of the sort that admired figures have
undertaken at pivotal moments throughout history. Nor should the obvious
diversity in conceptions of reason necessarily prove embarrassing.
Reason meant, in essence, a human capacity for grasping truth. Just how
that capacity functioned was, to be sure, a source of disagreement. So
conceptions of reason differed. But it would be wrong to conclude that
reason signified nothing more than a word, or a slogan: what held the
diverse conceptions together was the shared understanding that reason is
a capacity for knowing and living by truth—or by Truth.
The consensus criterion. In different ways, Enlightenment thinkers
gravitated to the view that agreement or consensus should serve as a
working principle governing the operation of reason. The commitment
to what we can call a “consensus criterion” was a natural if complex and
sometimes compromised consequence of the component just
discussed—the separation of reason from culture.
Indeed, the consensus criterion might seem to be a natural
consequence of reason itself. Both before and since the Enlightenment,
that is, reason has usually been taken as describing a common human
faculty, or even a feature that defines what it means to be human: the
human being is supposed to be the “rational animal.” And if reason is a
common human faculty, then it seems to follow—doesn’t it?—that
arguments based on reason ought to be able to gain the assent of anyone
who will honestly consider them.40 In the Middle Ages, however, reason
stood as a sort of junior partner to a higher source of truth, “revelation,”
which operated to guide and correct it. And the exercise of reason
depended on training in a large body of philosophical and theological
writings that conveyed the truths that reason and revelation had
accumulated over the centuries. Thomas Aquinas’s Summas were the
consummate expression of this medieval enterprise of reason. So it
would hardly be surprising if persons untrained and unversed in this
dreamed up as objects of pure, detached intellectual study. Instead, it was a timely
response to a specific historical challenge—the political, social, and theological chaos
embodied in the Thirty Years’ War.”).
40. Thus, Aquinas explained that in debating with those who do not accept
Christian scripture “[w]e must, therefore, have recourse to the natural reason, to which
all men are forced to give their assent.” But he quickly added that “in divine matters the
natural reason has its failings.” SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA CONTRA
GENTILES, I, ch. 2 (Anton C. Pegis trans., 1975 ed.).
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corpus of learning might fail to grasp the truth of vital matters: even
what is self-evident, Aquinas explained, may not be self-evident to us.41
The point is not that there was anything duplicitous or hypocritical in
the medieval view that truths known through reason might nonetheless
be accessible only to those who have been properly trained in a body of
received learning. Some such qualification will inevitably attend any
conception of reason. Thus, Coke made essentially the same point to
James I in explaining why the common law, though the perfection of
reason, could be known not through the “natural reason” possessed in
ample measure by the king, but only through “artificial reason” and with
the aid of “long Study and Experience [in the law] before . . . a [man]
can attain to . . . [c]ognizance of it.”42 No doubt students in any complex
and developed field—science, math, law—are told the same. In a
related vein, Enlightenment thinkers themselves were acutely conscious
of the fact that reason cannot operate in people whose minds are
befogged by prejudice or passion—or religious enthusiasm or
fanaticism. Hence the chant of the aroused French masses—aroused in
part by a comely young woman chosen to serve as the “Goddess of
Reason”—outside the newly christened Temple of Reason (the erstwhile
Cathedral of Notre Dame): “Reason Forever! Down with fanaticism!”43
Though Americans were a bit calmer, still, as Henry May explains,
“[s]elf-evident truth, most of the framers believed, was much more selfevident to some than to others. On the whole government worked best if
it remained in the hands of gentlemen of generous education and large
views.”44 So Enlightenment reason, it seems, has always understood
itself and its claims to be subject to some such “reasonable persons”
qualification: reason for the reasonable.
Still, by separating reason from culture, and by purporting to renounce
reliance on tradition and authority, the Enlightenment conception
necessarily undermined that sort of qualification, and thereby shifted
greater emphasis to consensus as a criterion for measuring the successful
exercise of reason. If reason is something that all competent persons are
capable of, then the results of reasoning ought in principle to be
recognizable by all competent persons—not only by people acculturated
in a particular religious or political tradition. The ploughman should be

41. Summa Theologica, I.II., Q. 94, A. 1.
42. For a summary of the incident, see Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objectives and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 810
(2002).
43. The episode is recounted in 2 ADOLPH THIERS, THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION 370–371 (Frederick Shoberl trans. 1850).
44. MAY, DIVIDED HEART, supra note 10, at 155.
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on a par with the professor.45 In this way, Enlightenment reason has a
common denominator quality: it steers inquirers away from the
particular,46 the local, the “sectarian,” toward what everyone can
understand and accept.
In science (which partisans of Enlightenment have typically regarded
as a sort of alter ego, or at least as a brother—subject to the occasional
sibling rivalry),47 this consensus criterion is expressed in the requirements
that observations be mutually verifiable and that experiments be
repeatable. Although these requirements cannot be transferred intact to
moral and political thought, a similar principle is reflected in the effort
to derive conclusions not from authority but rather from reasons and
premises whose truth should be apparent to all honest inquirers. Once
again, the Declaration of Independence manifests this assumption. It
begins by expressing “a decent respect to the opinions” not merely of
people brought up in a particular political or religious tradition, but
rather “of mankind.”48 And the Declaration goes on to offer what are
held out as “self-evident” truths—truths that should be recognizable as
such by “a candid world.”49
As the Declaration’s language reflects, the overall Enlightenment
commitment is still to truth. We are to live by truth, . . . which is known
by reason, . . . the successful operation of which should be reflected in
the achievement of consensus among reasonable persons. The connection
linking consensus, reason, and truth needs emphasizing because, as we
will see, consensus can be sought for purposes other than discerning
truth.
Freedom of expression. The association of reason with a consensus
criterion is nicely compatible with one more specific political
commitment commonly associated with the Enlightenment: freedom of
expression. No doubt Enlightenment thinkers varied in the strength and
scope of their commitment to free speech. But they tended to favor the
45. Cf. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), reprinted in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 425 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975) (“State a moral case
to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, and often better than
the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.”).
46. Donald Livingston explains that Enlightenment thinkers saw “reason” as the
opposite of “tradition” precisely because tradition was an embodiment of “scandalous
particularities.” LIVINGSTON, supra note 15, at 244.
47. See PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION 126–29 (1966).
48. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 8.
49. Id. at para. 2.
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idea, at least in principle and sometimes in practice50—witness
Jefferson’s and Madison’s resistance to the Alien and Sedition Acts—and
on their own premises they should have. Freedom of speech is related to
a consensus-oriented conception of reason in two ways. First, freedom
is a necessary condition of measuring or discerning the existence of
consensus. Allowing people to express their views, that is, seems the
only way to ascertain whether a real consensus exists: how are we to tell
whether people agree unless they are free to say what they think?
Second, even where people do not initially agree, an interchange of
views seems calculated to lead people in the direction of consensus.
Or does it? The statement admittedly reflects a grand leap of faith—and
one that experience over the last two centuries might seem to belie.51
Open, candid discussion seems likely to lead in the direction of an
agreed upon truth in a given domain on two assumptions: first, that there
is in fact a truth to be found in that domain and, second, that thinking
and discussing are efficacious means of discerning that truth.52
Conversely, if there is no truth to be discovered in a given domain—the
domain of morality, for example—then there is no a priori reason to
suppose that open discussion would be likely to lead towards consensus.
And if discourse is understood not so much as a means of exchanging
ideas about truth but rather in other terms—as an instrument for
achieving one’s interests, or as a manifestation of personal or collective
identity—then there would be little reason to expect free discussion to
lead either to truth or to consensus. On the contrary.
So once again, the commitment of the classical Enlightenment to
freedom of expression rests on the more fundamental premise that truth,
50. See ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 92–
95 (1985 ed.). In this spirit, Kant argued that “[f]reedom of the pen is the sole safeguard
of the rights of the people.” GAY, supra note 47, at 71. Michael Kent Curtis observes
that “[f]or the founding generation, ideas of free speech and press grew in the
environment of the Enlightenment.” Curtis, Monkey Trials: Science, Defamation, and
the Suppression of Dissent, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 507, 546 (1995).
51. Cf. Frederick Schauer, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 26 (1982).
It is hardly surprising that the search for truth was so central in the writings
of Milton, Locke, Voltaire, and Jefferson. They placed their faith in the ability
of reason to solve problems and distinguish truth from falsehood. They had
confidence in the reasoning power of all people, if only that power were
allowed to flourish. The argument from truth is very much a child of the
Enlightenment, and of the optimistic view of the rationality and perfectibility it
embodied. But the naïveté of the Enlightenment has since been largely
discredited by history and by contemporary insights of psychology.
Id. (emphasis in original).
52. Cf. Christopher T. Wonnell, Truth and the Marketplace of Ideas, 19 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 669, 671 (1986) (“The linkage between free speech and truth seemed
particularly persuasive to Enlightenment thinkers convinced of the power of human
reason.”).
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or Truth, exists and that human beings can and should know it and live
by it. But what gives plausibility to that sanguine premise? It might
almost seem that such a happy state of affairs could exist only in a
providentially designed universe—one in which, as Descartes had
thought, a benevolent deity could serve as a sort of guarantor of human
understanding.53 And that, as it happens, was precisely what most
Enlightenment thinkers (at least in America) did believe.
A common, providential worldview. The premise positing the
existence of Truth and the commensurability of Truth with the human
mind was nicely consonant with a worldview that was uniformly
embraced by the Enlightened architects of the American constitutional
order. “The Constitutional debates,” Henry May explains, “reveal beneath
fierce disagreements a deep, taken-for-granted unity among Federalists
and Antifederalists, conservatives and liberals, the party of commerce
and the party of virtue—even between Calvinists and Deists.”54 This
agreement extended across a surprisingly broad spectrum of topics:
“religion, human nature, theory of knowledge, political theory, history,
and the right kind of governing class.”55
One aspect of this consensus deserves special emphasis, both because
it may seem surprising to modern thinkers and because, as suggested
above, it served as a presupposition for reasoning about the other topics,
including those central to American constitutionalism. For much of
Western history, the universe had been conceived of as a divinelyinstituted normative order or, as Louis Dupre puts it, an “ontotheological
synthesis”;56 and morality (including political morality) had been
understood as the art or practice of living in harmony with that order.
Imposing labels anachronistically, we may today suppose that because
the Enlightenment was supposed to have been a secular movement
rebelling against a tradition that was religious, Enlightenment thinkers
must have repudiated this belief in a providential order. But this
supposition turns history on its head. Not only did the classical
Enlightenment retain a faith in the existence of a normative cosmic
53. DESCARTES, supra note 4, at 21–22.
54. MAY, DIVIDED HEART, supra note 10, at 147–48 (emphasis omitted).
55. Id. at 150.
56. Dupre explains that in classical thought, the universe was viewed as a
“kosmos,” or as an “ontotheological synthesis,” in which nature itself was thought to
have “theological and anthropic as well as physical meanings.” LOUIS DUPRE, PASSAGE
TO MODERNITY: AN ESSAY IN THE HERMENEUTICS OF NATURE AND CULTURE 3, 11, 18
(1993).
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order; the accomplishment of thinkers like Locke, as Carl Becker noted,
was precisely to subvert religious doctrines, such as the Calvinist
doctrine of depravity, that had undermined confidence in the capacity of
human beings to comprehend and conform to that overarching order.57
The assumption of a providential order pervaded Jeffersonian thinking
and provided the premise for reasoning on questions of all kinds—moral,
political, or scientific. Was the earth created much as it is now? Or did
it evolve over a long period of time? Do mammoths still exist? Do
human beings have natural rights beyond the positive legal rights
conferred on them by particular legal systems? Jefferson’s answers to
these questions (respectively yes, no, yes, yes) all derived from his belief
in an overarching providential order in the universe.58 In particular, the
providential framework provided the basis for specific commitments
to natural or human rights. For Jefferson, as Daniel Boorstin puts it, “no
claim[] [of rights] could be validated except by the Creator’s
plan . . . .”59 The essential idea is succinctly expressed, once again, in
the Declaration:60 “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights . . . .”61
The unapologetically religious character of eighteenth-century
Enlightenment discourse, and more specifically its persistent reliance on
the premise of a providential order, may be disconcerting to modern
heirs of the Enlightenment.62 And indeed, the divergence in this respect
57. BECKER, supra note 7, at 64–65.
58. Overwhelming evidence for this assertion is marshaled in DANIEL J. BOORSTIN,
THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 194, 196 (1993). I give a succinct summary of
the evidence from Boorstin and a few other sources, as well as citations for the specific
questions mentioned in the text, in Steven D. Smith, Nonsense and Natural Law, in PAUL
CAMPOS, ET AL., AGAINST THE LAW 100 (1996). See generally HENRY F. MAY, THE
ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976).
59. BOORSTIN, supra note 58, at 196. “The word ‘right’ was always a signpost
pointing back to the divine plan of the Creation.” Id. at 194.
60. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 8, at para. 2 (emphasis
added).
61. Cf. George P. Fletcher, In God’s Image: The Religious Imperative of Equality
Under Law, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1608, 1611 (1999) (“Behind those created equal stands a
Creator, who is the source of our inalienable rights ‘to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.’”).
For a contrary interpretation that makes the “Creator” largely
synonymous with a not necessarily theistic “nature,” see MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE
NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC 41–55 (1996).
62. Henry F. May explains that “neglect of religion or of theology is one common
error among historians of the Enlightenment,” and he offers a hypothesis about how a
“homogenized version of the Enlightenment” that downplayed its religious dimension
came to prevail:
In America [this depiction] comes mostly . . . from the . . . moderate and liberal
left to which most of us academics usually give our allegiance. This version, I
think, reached its greatest strength in America in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century among pragmatic social scientists, among them James
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between classical Enlightenment thought and more modern thinking of
an Enlightenment bent reflects a crucial divide between the classical and
modern Enlightenments. In the eighteenth-century context, though,
reasoning on the assumption of an overarching normative order was
entirely compatible with the Enlightenment conception of reason.
Reason, as noted, entailed a search for the common denominator—for
what seemed true to everyone, regardless of the particularities of culture
or the idiosyncrasies of the individual believer. But in the America of
the founders, nearly everyone adhered either to some species of
Protestantism or to some Protestant offshoot—unitarianism, deism,
rational or natural religion. These diverse faiths shared a belief in a
divine Author or Architect who created the universe according to an
intelligent and benevolent plan. The few Catholics and even fewer Jews
who might have registered on the Americans’ intellectual landscape
would not have dissented from this general proposition. And there were,
James Turner argues, literally no atheists detectable on the scene—or at
least none other than perhaps Joel Barlow.63
In this context, the belief in a divinely-ordained normative order had a
nonsectarian quality—or at least it could seem to have this quality to the
responsible, disciplined mind that did not allow itself to rove too far
beyond the immediate “live” intellectual options or to dwell on exotic
possibilities. No doubt a person of learning, like Jefferson, was aware at
least on a purely cognitive level that in the far reaches of the world (or
even in places he had visited—France, for instance) there were, for
example, genuine atheists. But this remote fact need not disturb the
present working consensus any more than a brief occasional encounter
with believers in reincarnation troubles a modern Western secularist.64
Harvey Robinson and, in far less naïve form, John Dewey. These men, like
many others in all periods and especially in the eighteenth century, tended to
think that all history inevitably led to themselves. Thus, as they saw it, the
“mind of the eighteenth century” moved gradually from orthodoxy to natural
religion to deism and finally to pragmatic secularism.
HENRY F. MAY, IDEAS, FAITHS, AND FEELINGS 131, 135 (1983) [hereinafter MAY, IDEAS].
63. What the orthodox called “atheism” usually amounted to nothing but a
Deistic denial of revealed religion. . . . If one disregards the expatriate Barlow
just before 1800, America does not seem to have harbored a single individual
before the nineteenth century who disbelieved in God. . . . For disbelief in
God remained scarcely more plausible than disbelief in gravity.
JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN AMERICA
44 (1985).
64. Cf. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 91 (1992) (describing a
personal encounter with believers in reincarnation):
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If reason sought the common denominator, in short, the providential
worldview was the common denominator. Indeed, in the eighteenthcentury climate of opinion, it would have been against reason to doubt
the providential worldview. “All believed in a universe that was presided
over by a benevolent deity, a universe that made sense in human terms
and was intelligible to human reason,” Henry May observes.65 So “most
if not all of the framers would have found it impossible to imagine any
other kind of universe.”66
The eighteenth-century convergence. In sum, the classical Enlightenment
reflected a happy convergence of elements. A universe designed and
governed by a benevolent providence provided the Truth by which
people might aspire to live—a Truth that transcended any particular
culture, and that was knowable because it was providentially
commensurate with the operations of the human mind. Through free and
honest discussion people might hope to come ever closer to a full and
shared understanding of this Truth.
II. THE MODERN IDEAL: INVERTING THE ENLIGHTENMENT
The historical Enlightenment, as noted, is often said to have dissolved
in the nineteenth century. But many modern political and constitutional
theorists continue to invoke it—or to have it invoked in their behalf—in
support of a liberal vision of American constitutionalism. So how is the
modern ideal related to the classical position just discussed?
In addressing this question, a preliminary caution is in order. The
modern Enlightenment, like the classical one, is “necessarily rather
amorphous and diverse.”67 So what I will be calling “the Enlightenment
ideal” will again reflect a selective and contestable interpretation. Its
contestability will be especially conspicuous because, unlike Descartes
and Jefferson, the partisans of the modern Enlightenment are our friends
When I lectured on the mind-body problem in India and was assured by
several members of my audience that my views must be mistaken, because
they personally had existed in their earlier lives as frogs or elephants, etc., I did
not think, “Here is evidence for an alternative world view,” or even “Who
knows, perhaps they are right.” And my insensitivity was much more than
mere cultural provincialism: Given what I know about how the world works, I
could not regard their views as serious candidates for truth.
65. MAY, DIVIDED HEART, supra note 10, at 151.
66. Id. For a similar argument, see SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE NATION WITH THE SOUL
OF A CHURCH 18–20 (1975). Mead argues that “most of the men who had a hand in
framing the Declaration and the Constitution and in launching the new government”
acted on the basis of a sort of “theology of the Republic.” This theology was not
“distinctively Protestant or even Christian.” At the same time, “those who try to make
secularists—in the classical sense—out of [the framers] are just as wrong” as those who
argue for a Protestant or Christian founding. Id. at 21.
67. See PORTER, supra note 3.
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and neighbors (and often ourselves); we know that their views—or our
views—are complex, and that we differ among ourselves, and that not
everyone who might be classified as a partisan for present purposes will
happily claim to descend from the Enlightenment. Some, such as Rawls,
may even try to distance themselves from it. Rawls—that “titan of our
age”68—is an especially troublesome case. I think that he must be taken
as the most influential contemporary American theorist of the
Enlightenment ideal,69 and that any discussion of that ideal needs to refer
to ideas associated with him. Yet, not only does Rawls disclaim the
label—or at least qualify it70—but his position is highly complicated
and, it seems, ever developing, and the interpretation and criticism or
defense of Rawls has become, in some academic quarters, a less than
magnificent obsession. That is not an obsession that we should allow to
consume us here. So let it be clear that my purpose in what follows is
not to offer a definitive interpretation of Rawls—or any other particular
thinker—but rather to try to extract a sort of ideal or orientation that,
subject of course to variations and different degrees of commitment,
animates a good deal of the thought of influential theorists such as
Rawls, Stephen Macedo, Martha Nussbaum, Robert Audi, Amy
Gutmann, Thomas Nagel, Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, and Kent
Greenawalt, and that has discernible if complicated effects on actual
constitutional decisions and doctrines.
The ongoing commitment to reason. The most obvious connection
linking the modern ideal to the historical Enlightenment is a shared
professed commitment to governance in accordance with reason. Modern
theorists enthusiastically embrace the vocabulary of reason—indeed, one
sometimes wonders whether their word processors have been infected
with a virus that spreads the word “reason” and its cognates through
68. Michael P. Zuckert, Is Modern Liberalism Compatible with Limited
Government? The Case of Rawls, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY 49, 80
(Robert P. George ed., 1996).
69. Rawls’s position is routinely understood to be in the tradition of Kantian
liberalism. Cf. RICHARD RORTY, Religion as Conversation-Stopper (1994), in PHILOSOPHY
AND SOCIAL HOPE 168, 170 (1999) (describing Rawls and Habermas as “the two most
prominent social thinkers of the present day, and of the central secularizing message of
the Enlightenment”).
70. Rawls asserts that his position is unlike “Enlightenment liberalism” in that it
does not present liberalism as a comprehensive doctrine and does not attack orthodox
Christianity. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xl (paperback ed. 1996) [hereinafter
RAWLS, PL]; JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES
131, 176 (1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, Public Reason].
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their writings like an epidemic71—and, moreover, their understanding of
reason exhibits important resemblances to the Enlightenment conception.
Most significantly, modern heirs to the Enlightenment legacy persist in
emphasizing the distinction separating reason from culture and tradition.
And they claim to embrace the consensus criterion at least as warmly as
the historical figures did.
These aspects of Enlightenment reason are readily apparent in Rawls’s
influential writings. The ideal of a political community shaped by and
committed to “public reason” pervades Rawls’s thought. And despite
other differences from his historical forbears,72 Rawls’s notions of
reason have a distinctly Enlightenment cast. The separation of reason
from culture and tradition is reflected in Rawls’s insistence that public
reason must remain “freestanding” and independent of any and all
“comprehensive doctrines”73—views which might well grow out of and
reflect particular cultures or intellectual traditions. Instead, the content
of reason is confined to “presently accepted general beliefs and forms of
reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of
science when these are not controversial.”74 By confining reason to
these largely uncontested materials, Rawls hopes to build on and secure
an overlapping consensus among reasonable views.75
Although theorists differ among themselves, Rawls’s vision of public
reason is in essential respects much like the “democratic deliberation”
favored by other theorists. In an essay advocating what he calls “liberal
public reason,” Stephen Macedo notices the common themes uniting the
public reason of theorists like Rawls and the “deliberative democracy”
of theorists like Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson.76 These common
themes, moreover, are precisely those that flow from the Enlightenment
conception of reason, with its consensus criterion.77 The core demand is
that public deliberation should “be carried on in terms that are mutually
acceptable,” not on the basis of “sectarian” views.78
In this particular, therefore, modern liberal theorists can plausibly
claim to be faithful heirs of the Enlightenment. In other respects,
71. See, e.g., RAWLS, PL, supra note 70, at li (“[W]e must give them reasons they
can not only understand . . . but reasons we might reasonably expect that they as free and
equal might reasonably also accept.”).
72. See supra note 70.
73. See RAWLS, PL, supra note 70, at xxxix–lvii, 212–54.
74. Id. at 224.
75. Id. at 134.
76. Stephen Macedo, In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and
Abortion Hard Cases?, in NATURAL LAW AND PUBLIC REASON 11, 13, 25–26 (Robert P.
George & Christopher Wolfe eds., 2000).
77. Cf. RORTY, supra note 14, at 173 (describing “consensus” as “the test of a
belief ” in a democracy).
78. Macedo, supra note 76, at 25.

1280

SMITH S..DOC

[VOL. 41: 1263, 2004]

8/22/2019 1:27 PM

Recovering (From) Enlightenment?
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

though, they depart from the classical position. The departures are not
minor; moreover, they have the effect of turning essential Enlightenment
aspirations upside down.
The disintegration of the classical position. In the eighteenth century,
the components discussed above seemed nicely harmonious. But two
centuries later, this happy congruity has been decisively shattered. The
breakdown of the eighteenth-century convergence has been in large
measure a result of several currents, ironically, that are often associated
with the Enlightenment itself. We can briefly notice three such
developments: democracy, pluralism, and secularism.
Though modern partisans of Enlightenment (such as, outstandingly,
Dewey) may claim “democracy” for their cause, the thinkers of the
historical Enlightenment were typically not greatly enamored of
democracy.79 Henry May argues that both in Europe and in America,
the partisans of Enlightenment were generally suspicious of “the
masses,” and that the major democratizing force was in fact radical
Protestantism.80 Nonetheless, the Enlightenment commitment to equality
(expressed in the Declaration of Independence) together with the
acceptance of consensus as the criterion of reason contained a
democratizing impulse—one that played itself out over the next two
centuries through enlargement of the franchise, expansion of educational
opportunities, and in other ways. One result of this development was
that the number of people who presumptively “counted” for purposes of
determining the existence of a consensus multiplied dramatically. This
expansion, we might surmise, would almost necessarily make the
achievement of a genuine consensus on momentous issues more
difficult. The difficulty would be compounded by the increasing
pluralism—religious, political, cultural—that, as theorists like Rawls
stress, now appears to be a natural and irreversible accompaniment of
Enlightened political commitments to freedom of religion and freedom
of expression.81
If democracy and pluralism hindered the achievement of consensus by
multiplying viewpoints, an evolving secularism undermined the
79. Cf. Robert K. Faulkner, Jefferson and the Enlightened Science of Liberty, in
REASON AND REPUBLICANISM: THOMAS JEFFERSON’S LEGACY OF LIBERTY 31, 34 (Gary L.
McDowell and Sharon L. Noble eds., 1997) (noting that “[w]hile Jefferson celebrated a
self-governing people, he despised and feared city mobs and, in general, the
unenlightened”).
80. MAY, DIVIDED HEART, supra note 10, at 163–66.
81. See RAWLS, Public Reason, supra note 70, at xviii, xxiv.
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particular basis for consensus that the eighteenth century had enjoyed.
As discussed, the so-called “secularism” of the classical Enlightenment
had seemed compatible with a providential worldview, but this
partnership dissolved as, among other things, modern science offered a
new vision of how the universe is constituted. Though it now appears
that secularization is neither as uniform nor as inexorable as it once
seemed,82 it still dominates some sectors of the culture, especially the
academy (which of course imagines itself to be the main bastion of
Enlightenment);83 and one consequence of that change has been that in
those sectors the belief in a divinely-established normative order, widely
shared in the eighteenth century, has by now come to seem at best highly
sectarian.
As these developments have subverted the comfortable alliance
among the components of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, the
meaning of the slogan of reason, or of a collective life governed by
reason, has changed as well, becoming in important ways just the
opposite of the classical meaning.
Reason or Truth? Most fundamentally, the classical belief that reason
is valuable as an adjunct to the commitment to living in accordance with
Truth has given way to a radically altered understanding in which
reason—or at least the kind of public reason that is supposed to govern
the political community—is carefully and deliberately insulated against
questions and claims of Truth.
The first step in the divorce of reason from Truth comes with the
conclusion that reason should be independent of religious premises or
values, or of a religious worldview. Religious beliefs, after all, cannot
satisfy the consensus criterion that is the working principle of reason.
Purged of religion, public discourse becomes secular.84 In this spirit,
82. See Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview, in
THE DESECULARIZATION OF THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS 1–3
(Peter L. Berger ed., 1999).
83. See id. at 10 (“There exists an international subculture composed of people
with Western-type higher education, especially in the humanities and social sciences,
that is indeed secularized. This subculture is the principal ‘carrier’ of progressive,
Enlightened beliefs and values.”).
84. This sentence admittedly glosses over major difficulties. From the fact that
Enlightenment reason no longer supports the providential worldview within which the
founding generation operated, does it logically follow, one might ask, that this
conception does impel us to adopt a “secular” worldview or discourse? Isn’t that
worldview also controversial—and hence ruled out by the consensus criterion? The
modern partisan of Enlightenment is likely to respond, I think, that a secular worldview
is uncontroversial (among properly educated and “reasonable” people, at least), or that a
secular worldview is “neutral” among the controversial alternatives, or that a secular
worldview is what we are left with by default from the inability of “reason” to support
any more theologically or metaphysically ambitious worldview. All of these responses
are deeply problematic, but for immediate, mainly descriptive purposes we need not be
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Kathleen Sullivan asserts that the United States Constitution brought
about “the establishment of the secular public order.”85 And the modern
Supreme Court has stumbled in the general direction of this conclusion.
Thus, modern establishment doctrine, though notoriously capricious in
its operations, at least purports to limit government to acting for secular
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.86
The requirement of secularity limits what government can do (as well
as why government can do what it does); it also regulates what
government can say. This kind of regulation is evident in the “endorsement”
construction that has been added to establishment doctrine over the last
couple of decades. Though implementation has been erratic, current
doctrine holds that government cannot do or say anything that sends a
message endorsing or disapproving of any religion.87 This prohibition
has the effect of discouraging the inclusion of religion in public decision
making, because religious statements offered in support of a measure
may condemn it by causing the measure to be perceived as an
endorsement of religion.88
Notice that the exclusion of religion from public decision making is
not based—not officially, at least—on any assumption that religion is
false. Indeed, defenders of current doctrine insist on the point: The
secularity requirement is supposed to be simply “neutral” toward
too scrupulous on this point.
85. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
195, 201 (1992).
86. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971), aff’d 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
87. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 766–70 (1995).
It is sometimes noted that the prohibition on endorsement of religion, at least by any
unstrained interpretation, would render problematic if not flatly invalidate a host of
measures and pronouncements that have often been counted as part of the core of the
American political tradition—significant parts of Jefferson’s Virginia Statute for
Religious Liberty, the Declaration of Independence, Washington’s Farewell Address and
the Gettysburg Address and all of Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address, as well as the
national motto and the Pledge of Allegiance—because of their explicit religious content.
Some of these pronouncements—in particular, Jefferson’s religious freedom statute and
the Declaration of Independence—were monuments of the classical Enlightenment in
America. Thus, the widespread appeal of the “no endorsement” principle dramatically
illustrates the modern shift away from the classical Enlightenment.
88. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (striking down a “moment
of silence” law under the particular circumstances of the case in part because of
statements by the sponsor which the Court took to express a religious purpose—
promoting prayer in public schools). For a critical discussion of this and similar cases,
see STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALITY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM IN AMERICA 116–34 (2001).
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religion.89 And Rawls maintains—though many critics and even
supporters remain unpersuaded—that his own version of political
liberalism does not pass judgment on the truth of religious or other
comprehensive views—even of those declared to be unreasonable.90
Hence, both the secularity requirement of constitutional doctrine and the
Rawlsian notion of public reason purport to be compatible with the
possibility that religion is a source or manifestation of important truths.
But it is simply not the role of government—and of the reason that is
supposed to guide government—to concern itself with such truths.
Though religion is the most conspicuous of the belief systems to be
excluded from the domain of public reason, as currently conceived, it is
not the only one. After all, if there is no consensus supporting religion,
or any particular religion, there is probably no consensus in favor of any
other general view or philosophy of life, human nature, or morality.
Thus, theorists like Rawls and Macedo are clear that no “comprehensive
conception of truth and the human good as a whole,”91 religious or
secular, can properly be invoked in the exercise of public reason.
By excluding any comprehensive view of truth from the domain of
public reason, theorists like Rawls and Macedo deflect the suspicion that
they are simply hostile to religion. But they also make it clear that
reason, for all of its prominence in their positions, is no longer serving
the function of guiding people to live in accordance with Truth.92 That
sort of Truth, rather, is beyond the purview of reason, or at least of
public reason; it is something for people to pursue individually or in
private associations. Public reason is now seen as serving other, more
89. For critical discussion, see STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE
QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 81–84 (1995).
90. For a careful exposition and critical analysis of Rawls’s position on this point,
see J. JUDD OWEN, RELIGION AND THE DEMISE OF LIBERAL RATIONALISM: THE
FOUNDATIONAL CRISIS OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 100–21 (2001). In a
laudatory essay, Edward Foley quotes a passage in which Rawls denies that political
liberalism reflects a judgment about the truth of an “unreasonable” religious position, but
Foley adds in a footnote: “I confess I am not altogether sure about the meaning of this
passage. It seems to me that liberalism does reject as false, as well as unreasonable, the
idea that the state must endorse a particular creed if the people are to avoid eternal
damnation.” Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 963, 975 & n.40. (1993) (emphasis in original).
Foley goes on to list other religious beliefs that the liberal state must regard as false, and
he cites language in which Rawls himself seems, though perhaps inadvertently, to
acknowledge this fact. Id. at 976–78.
91. Macedo, supra note 76, at 18.
92. The theorists are perfectly candid on this point. Macedo explains, for example,
that “philosophical and religious views . . . proceed from the point of view of a
comprehensive conception of truth and the human good as a whole.” But “in the modern
world, . . . people disagree about their views of truth as a whole,” and consequently such
views are not appropriate bases for public discourse. Macedo, supra note 76, at 18
(emphasis added).
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political and social values such as cooperativeness, reciprocity, and a
common citizenship.93
Indeed, it would be at most a slight exaggeration to say that whereas
in the classical Enlightenment the purpose of reason was to orient
discourse toward Truth, under the modern ideal the purpose of public
reason is precisely to prevent the introduction of questions and claims
about Truth from entering into public discourse. The commitment to
reason gradually evolves—or deteriorates—into a commitment to
reasonableness,94 which consists precisely of a willingness (in the
interests of fairness and “getting along”) to refrain from pushing reason
too deep or too far.95 In a humorous mood, Michael Zuckert captures the
change by imagining a comment of Calvin on the modern posture
(though the comment might as well come from the signatories of the
Declaration of Independence who, as noted, pledged all they had in the
defense of what they took to be self-evident truths):
For shame, Professor Rawls. Is a bit of threat to your comfort and safety all it
takes to scare you off your “convictions”? . . . Do you men of Harvard know
nothing of truth? Martin Luther said, “Here I stand, I can do no other.” He
knew the princes of church and state would give him no peace, no rest, yet he
stood. And you Harvard philosophers, what do you say? “Here I sit. I dare do
no more.”96

By separating reason from truth in a large sense, or from the “whole
truth,” the modern ideal inverts the classical position. And that inversion
manifests itself in other aspects of the modern ideal as well.
The instrumentalization of discourse. The rejection of a providential
93. Id. at 23–24.
94. See Jody S. Kraus, Political Liberalism and Truth, 5 LEGAL THEORY 45, 55
(1999) (“Political liberalism’s preferred strategy is to substitute the idea of
reasonableness for truth.”).
95. The development I have in mind here arguably separates not only the classical
Enlightenment from the modern one; it also divides an early pragmatist philosopher such
as Peirce from a contemporary one like Rorty. In a dialogue constructed from quotations
from these two philosophers, Susan Haack nicely captures the difference. SUSAN
HAACK, “We Pragmatists . . .”: Peirce and Rorty in Conversation, in MANIFESTO OF A
PASSIONATE MODERATE 31–47 (1998). Here is Rorty: “[The] pragmatist view [is] of
rationality as civility, . . . of ‘true’ as a word which applies to those beliefs upon which
we are able to agree . . . .” Now Peirce: “You certainly opine that there is such a thing as
Truth. Otherwise, reasoning and thought would be without a purpose.” Id. at 32.
96. ZUCKERT, supra note 68, at 72. Cf. OWEN, supra note 90, at 127 (“The ‘virtue’
of getting along, of not insisting on anything (too) controversial, is elevated by Rawls to
the highest possible plane. . . . Nothing, Rawls tells us, can be so important that it is
worth disrupting the peaceful scheme of social cooperation.”).
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worldview—and the exclusion of “comprehensive views” generally
from public reason—means that reason cannot operate in the same way
it did in the classical scheme of things. So how is reason to work in
public decision making without violating the consensus criterion?
The most tempting prospect is to view reason in instrumental or
means-end terms—as a method for figuring out how to achieve shared
goals in the most efficient way. Not surprisingly, instrumentalism
dominated much of twentieth-century legal thought.97 And the Supreme
Court has often imported an instrumental conception of reason into its
doctrines.98
Instrumental reasoning is apt enough when shared goals or values in
fact exist and the question is how best to realize them. With respect to
other kinds of questions, however, instrumental reasoning seems less
efficacious. It has little to say, for example, on vital questions of
distributive justice.99 In addition, instrumental rationality, though it may
provide valuable clarification of alternatives, stands mostly mute before
controversies primarily reflecting deep-seated differences in values or
moral commitments—such as abortion or affirmative action. Perhaps
most fundamentally, means-end reasoning is largely powerless to
provide justifications for the most fundamental commitments of the
American constitutional order, such as the truths of equality and natural
rights asserted in the Declaration of Independence. The problem
deserves further explanation.
The problem of justification. The possibility of devising satisfying
justifications for central commitments to things such as equality and
human rights is of course a controversial matter about which volumes
have been written; here we can only notice the difficulties. But it is no
97. See generally ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN
LEGAL THEORY 35 (1982).
98. Robert Nagel has perceptively discussed the surprisingly uniform methodology
adopted by the United States Supreme Court across a large variety of seemingly
disparate constitutional provisions. Whether the subject matter is commercial speech,
gender classifications, abortion, or state regulation of interstate commerce, “the Court
strikes the same chord again and again: the government must justify its rules by
articulating a sufficiently important purpose and by demonstrating that the rule in some
degree will actually achieve that purpose.” ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL
CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 106–07 (1989).
This monotonous demand for “means/end” rationality cannot be explained, Nagel
argues, by anything in the text of the diverse provisions the Court purports to apply;
rather, it reflects the influence of “general intellectual fashion.” Id. at 107, 110.
99. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 287 (5th ed. 1998)
(“[T]he efficiency ethic takes the existing distribution of income and wealth, and the
underlying human qualities that generate that distribution, as given, and within very
broad limits (what limits?) is uncritical of the changes in that distribution that are
brought about by efficient transactions between persons unequally endowed with the
world’s tangible and intangible goods.”).
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secret that the problem of providing a persuasive philosophical justification
for rights is a daunting one.100 Arguments about equality are similarly
voluminous and complex, but it may be worth considering one analysis
directly relevant to the issue here.
In an essay called On Equal Human Worth: A Critique of
Contemporary Egalitarianism, Louis Pojman notes that an assumption
that all humans are of equal worth is central to virtually all modern
political theorizing.101 But what is the justification for this assumption?
The notion of equal worth is hard to square with the empirical evidence:
Take any capacity or ability you like: reason, a good will, the capacity to
suffer, the ability to deliberate and choose freely, the ability to make moral
decisions and carry them out, self-control, sense of humor, health, athletic and
artistic ability, and it seems that humans . . . differ in the degree to which they
have those capacities and abilities.102

Pojman reinforces the point with almost gruesome vividness. Referring
to an essay in which Gregory Vlastos imagines humans explaining to a
Martian visitor that the “human worth” of all persons is equal, Pojman
proceeds to imagine the Martian’s response:
He invites Vlastos to consider Smith, a man of low morals and lower
intelligence, who abuses his wife and children, who hates exercising or work,
for whom novels are dull and art a waste of time, and whose joy it is to spend
his days as a couch potato, drinking beer, while watching mud wrestling, violent
sports, and soap operas on TV. He is an avid voyeur, devoted to child
pornography. He is devoid of intellectual curiosity, eschews science, politics,
100. Noting that the adopters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
deliberately avoided the problem of justification—one drafter insisted that the proposed
Declaration “was based on no philosophy whatsoever”—Mary Ann Glendon explains the
difficulty: rights today are usually tied to “human dignity,” and
[t]he common secular understandings are that human beings have dignity
because they are autonomous beings capable of making choices (Kant), or
because of the sense of empathy that most human beings feel for other sentient
creatures (Rousseau). But the former understanding has alarming implications
for persons of diminished capacity, and the latter places all morality on the
fragile basis of a transient feeling.
Mary Ann Glendon, Foundations of Human Rights: The Unfinished Business, 44 AM. J.
JURIS. 1, 1–2, 12–13 (1999). Michael Perry, a long-standing proponent of human rights,
concedes that the justification for human rights is perhaps the only essential matter of
public concern for which no secular justification is available: human rights, Perry
concludes, are “ineliminably religious.” MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
FOUR INQUIRIES 11–41 (1998).
101. Louis P. Pojman, On Equal Human Worth: A Critique of Contemporary
Egalitarianism, in EQUALITY 282 (Louis P. Pojman & Robert Westmoreland, eds.,
1997).
102. Id. at 294.
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and religion, and eats and drinks in a manner more befitting a pig than a person.
Smith lacks wit, grace, humor, technical skill, ambition, courage, self-control,
and wisdom. He is anti-social, morose, lazy, a freeloader who feels no guilt
about living on welfare, when he is perfectly able to work, has no social
conscience, and barely avoids getting caught for his petty thievery. He has no
talents, makes no social contribution, lacks a moral sense . . . . But Smith is
proud of one thing: that he is “sacred,” of “infinite worth,” of equal intrinsic
value as Abraham Lincoln, Mother Teresa, Albert Schweitzer, the Dalai Lama,
Jesus Christ, Gandhi, and Einstein. . . . From the egalitarian perspective, . . .
Smith is of equal intrinsic worth as the best citizen in his community. We could
excuse the Martian if he exhibited amazement at this incredible doctrine.103

So then what is the justification for saying that all persons are in some
important sense of equal worth? Pojman argues that as a historical
matter, the idea of human equality descends from a religious tradition.104
Often the justification takes the form of a claim that all humans are made
by, and in the image of, God.105 The justification is also expressed in the
imagery of family: “The language of human dignity and worth implies a
great family in which a benevolent and sovereign Father binds together
all his children in love and justice.”106 And that rationale can be given
more analytical form: Pojman identifies two principal justifications in
the religious tradition, which he calls “the Essentialist Argument” and
“the Argument from Grace.”107
But these are precisely the sorts of rationales that an Enlightened
public reason seeks to filter out of public discourse and public
justification. “What distinguishes most contemporary egalitarianism
from earlier natural law modes is its self-conscious secularism,” Pojman
observes.108 “There is no appeal to a God or a transcendental realm.”109
So Pojman examines ten leading secular arguments advanced by
theorists such as Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Kai Nielsen, Joel
Feinberg, Thomas Nagel, and Alan Gewirth; and he finds all of these
arguments wanting.110 Sometimes the arguments turn on demonstrable
fallacies or on flagrant and unsupported discursive leaps; more often,
103. Id. at 287.
104. Id. at 295.
105. “The argument implicit in the Judeo-Christian tradition seems to be that God is
the ultimate value and that humans derive their value by being created in his image and
likeness.” Id. at 295. Cf. Glendon, supra note 100, at 13 (“Most believers . . . would say
that dignity is grounded in the fact that human beings are made in the image and likeness
of God, but that proposition is unintelligible to nonbelievers.”).
106. Pojman, supra note 101, at 295.
107. The first argument holds that “God created all humans with an equal amount of
some property P, which constitutes high value.” The second argument suggests that
“actual value may be different in different people but grace compensates the
differences.” Id.
108. Id. at 282.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 283–94.
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they do not actually offer any justification for equality at all, but instead
simply assert or assume it, or else posit that in the absence of any
persuasive justification one way or the other we should adopt a
“presumption” of equal worth.111
Pojman concludes that egalitarian commitments are “simply a leftover
from a religious world view now rejected by all of the philosophers
discussed in this essay.”112 Secular egalitarians are free riders, living off
an inheritance they view with disdain. And he wonders whether “perhaps
we should abandon egalitarianism and devise political philosophies that
reflect naturalistic assumptions, theories which are forthright in viewing
humans as differentially talented animals who must get on together.”113
In sum, divorcing reason from any comprehensive views—and in
particular from the providential worldview widely held during the
American founding—pushes reason in a secular and instrumentalist
direction. But it is doubtful that mere instrumental and secular
rationality, for all their uses, can justify the most basic commitments of
the American constitutional order.
Manufacturing—and manipulating—consensus. Responses to this
challenge vary, of course, but it seems that the characteristic stance of
modern liberal theorists of an Enlightenment bent, following the
example of the architects of international human rights,114 is simply to
spurn the demand for justifications and to base the central commitments
to equality and rights on an ostensible consensus within the relevant
constituency. George Fletcher observes in this vein that
[m]odern philosophical approaches toward equality . . . are strongly committed,
vaguely, to some position on the spectrum, but they offer no reason why they
are so intensely committed to this value . . . . In the contemporary liberal
culture, equality is one of those values that has become so deeply held that it is
neither questioned nor justified.115

111. Id.
112. Id. at 283.
113. Id. at 296. For an analysis closely paralleling Pojman’s in important respects,
see Fletcher, supra note 61; GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: HOW
LINCOLN REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 91–105 (2001). See generally JEREMY
WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY (2002) (arguing that Locke’s commitment to
equality was firmly based in religious assumptions, and that modern efforts to support
the commitment have not to this point succeeded).
114. See supra note 100.
115. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION, supra note 113, at 95–96; cf. Patrick
McKinley Brennan, Arguing for Human Equality, 18 J.L. & RELIGION 99, 121 (2002)
(“[T]he persistent inquirer finds a sort of pseudo-analytic house-of-mirrors, of the sort
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This stance might seem to be a blatant abdication of the
Enlightenment demand that all practices and beliefs be justified by
reason. Still, there is a nice logic to the position. After all, the demand
for justifications may plausibly be understood as asking that partisans of
liberal constitutionalism show how their commitments are derived from
a persuasive comprehensive view—or from Truth. Eighteenth-century
justifications took that form, as we have seen. But of course this sort of
argument from Truth is precisely what modern public reason seeks to
discourage, at least as part of public discourse. So any attempt at
justification in this sense arguably betrays the modern Enlightenment
ideal.116 Conversely, modern reason still embraces the consensus
criterion. And the happy fact is, Stephen Macedo argues, that “America
does enjoy a widespread consensus on basic guarantees that constitute
the core of a political morality” including commitments to “fair
cooperation, civility among citizens who disagree reasonably, a belief in
basic liberties, and due process and the rule of law.”117
Though it is nicely congruent with the modern Enlightenment
orientation, however, this philosophically demure, consensus-oriented
approach remains vulnerable to potent objections. In the first place, the
core political ideals are not supported by any universal consensus. Even
the broad ideals of the Declaration of Independence—human equality,
natural or human rights—do not enjoy any consensus across the
spectrum of world cultures.118 So the consensus on which modern
partisans of Enlightenment rely seems limited to the people of liberal
that fortifies Michael White’s judgment that equality-talk is destined for triviality, if not
downright dishonesty.”).
116. In this vein, J. Judd Owen explains that “Rawlsian liberalism’s desire to refrain
from touching upon the truth of any comprehensive doctrine whatever entails a silence
about its own truth”; consequently, “the justification of liberalism cannot be part of
liberalism proper.” OWEN, supra note 90, at 109. For the same reason, Owen claims,
“‘public reason’ cannot itself be justified or even argued for with public reasons. It can
only be asserted.” Id. at 120. Though he criticizes the conclusion, Jody Kraus observes
that “[a]ccording to Rawls, political liberalism cannot take any position on the defense of
its own truth.” Kraus, supra note 94, at 60.
117. Macedo, supra note 76, at 27.
118. Ernest Gellner explains that “[i]ndividualism, egalitarianism, freedom,
sustained innovation—these traits are, in the comparative context of world history,
unusual, not to say eccentric.” ERNEST GELLNER, POSTMODERNISM, REASON AND
RELIGION 52 (1992).
No wonder that Americans tend to treat these principles as universal and
inherent in the human condition. The preamble to the American Declaration of
Independence informs them that its truths are self-evident, and Americans tend
to assume it to be so. But they are nothing of the kind: these assumptions are
in fact heretical or unintelligible in most other cultures.
Id.; cf. Fletcher, In God’s Image, supra note 61, at 1612–13 (citations omitted)
(“Nothing quite like ‘all men are created equal’ is ever cited in the German jurisprudence
of equality or, so far as I know, in any other legal culture of the world.”).
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democracies or perhaps even, as Macedo says, of America.119
But this limitation negates the Enlightenment resolution to make
reason independent of culture; it effectively turns reason into a
complacent endorsement of the ideals and values of the culture that in
our self-satisfaction we happen to inhabit. Indeed, proponents of the
modern Enlightenment ideal may be quite frank in acknowledging that
they simply have nothing to say—or no arguments to make—to people
who do not already share their basic premises and commitments.120 For
old-style partisans of a more hard edged reason like Ernest Gellner, this
acceptance of culture as providing the grounds for judgment is simply
disguised nihilism121—hardly what the Enlightenment aspired to. In a
similar vein, Vittorio Hosle sees in the modern tendency to present
liberal commitments as simply those of a particular culture a
“Nietzschean self-dissolution of enlightenment.”122
Moreover, even if we are content to ground central political
commitments in a merely local consensus, that consensus exists, if at all,
only at the most abstract level—at the level of generalities like equality,
reciprocity, fairness, and dignity. Modern partisans of Enlightenment
depend on these concepts to do a great deal of work in justifying more
specific decisions involving distributive justice or rights. But the
concepts are at best very abstract; in some instances, such as equality
and reciprocity, they are largely formal, and thus innocent of substantive
content.123 Meanwhile the actual argumentative work and the particular
119. “The fact is that America does enjoy a widespread consensus . . . .” Macedo,
supra note 76, at 27.
120. See, e.g., RAWLS, Public Reason, supra note 70, at 132–33 (noting, with
respect to those with a “zeal to embody the whole truth in politics,” that “[p]olitical
liberalism does not engage those who think in this way”). “They assert that the
religiously true, or the philosophically true, overrides the politically reasonable. We
simply say that such a doctrine is politically unreasonable. Within political liberalism
nothing more need be said.” Id. at 178.
121. See GELLNER, supra note 118, at 49.
[Ian] Jarvie’s simple and unanswerable point is that if all standards are an
expression of culture (and cannot be anything else), then no sense whatever
can be ascribed to criticizing cultures as a whole. No standards can then
conceivably exist, in terms of which this could ever be done. . . . [Clifford]
Geertz seems bizarrely blind to this genuine and fully justified fear . . . .
Id. Noting that Geertz denies being a nihilist, Gellner adds that the fact that the view that
normative standards are relative to culture implies nihilism “does not mean that people
must in fact, psychologically, also become nihilists if they are relativists. . . . We cannot
legislate against inconsistency, and have no wish to do so.” Id. at 50.
122. VITTORIO HOSLE, OBJECTIVE IDEALISM, ETHICS, AND POLITICS 44 (1998).
123. The classic modern exposition is Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95
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conclusions in specific controversies demand more specific and
substantive—and contested—premises. So how does a theorist—or a
court—get from a very general and perhaps purely formal premise to a
specific substantive conclusion without offending the consensus
criterion that modern reason uses as a working principle?
The crude answer would be, as the old farmer told the lost tourist,
“You cain’t get there from here.” But the practical questions of life
demand answers, so answers will somehow be forthcoming; and the
standard rhetorical moves that serve to deliver those answers have
become familiar. One tactic is to invoke a generic concept such as
equality, while tacitly importing a more specific substantive conception
that would be controversial if openly stated.124 Criticizing Rawls’s
position, for example, Michael Zuckert argues that although there may
be a cultural consensus favoring the concept of equality, “there is also a
wide range of disagreement over what about persons makes them equal,
and over what the claim of equality entitles them to.”125 But “when
Rawls brings the agreement on the concept of equality into his system he
treats it as if it were an agreement on a conception.”126 No such
agreement exists, however, so the “shift from concept to conception is
simply arbitrary and illegitimate within the terms of Rawls’s own
thought.”127
A different but equally familiar strategy is to gerrymander the
constituency so as to eliminate dissenters who might disturb the
necessary consensus. Reason, as noted, speaks only to “reasonable”
people, so those who inconveniently disagree with a necessary
proposition can easily be placed outside the boundaries by being
declared “unreasonable.” In this vein, the writings of theorists like
Rawls, Macedo, Gutmann, and Thompson teem with pronouncements
declaring what reasonable people believe, and disfellowshipping
dissenters from the congregation of the reasonable.
For those who inhabit the cultural neighborhood of Rawls, Macedo,
and Gutmann, the exclusionary implications of public reason or
democratic deliberation may be easy to overlook, or at least to excuse.
The claims of public reason will seem almost truistic; and Rawls,
Macedo, Dworkin, and associated representatives of the modern
Enlightenment will appear to be the personification of sweet reasonableness.
HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
124. I discuss this rhetorical strategy in the religion clause context at greater length
in STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALITY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM IN AMERICA 13–20 (2001).
125. Zuckert, supra note 68, at 77.
126. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
127. Id.
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Conversely, to those who dwell in other neighborhoods—even within the
broad community called “America”—the confident claims of these
enlightened thinkers will seem smug, incredible, and almost inexplicable.
Thus, perplexed at the spectacle of “[l]iberal ideologues, who celebrate
tolerance and pluralism while at the same time condemning any
meaningful dissent from their own thin idea of the good as not merely
wrong but contrary to the dictates of reason itself,” Paul Campos is
reduced to speculating that Rawlsian claims about reasonableness and
the overlapping consensus can enjoy plausibility only among a select
group of academicians whose world is effectively limited to those who
“work at the same institutions, attend the same conferences, read the
same newspapers, live in the same suburbs, and send their children to the
same schools.”128
In a similar vein, Stanley Fish painstakingly shows how a variety of
prominent liberal thinkers, always respectful of “Enlightenment decorums,”
effectively “elevat[e] the decorum of academic dinner parties to the
status of discourse universals.”129 Fish argues that when theorists like
Gutmann and Thompson talk about reason and reasonableness, in reality
all they are doing is negotiating a very small circle that begins and ends with
their own prior conviction and a vocabulary made in its image. The key word in
that vocabulary is ‘reasonable.’ But all that is meant by the word is what my
friends and I take to be so.130

Proponents of public reason will answer, of course, that Fish’s
characterization is unfair: citizens are classified as unreasonable not
because the theorists disagree with their substantive opinions but rather
because these citizens misunderstand or disrespect something like the
principle of reciprocity.131 But this criterion, upon closer inspection,
turns out to add nothing to the judgment that a person or view is
unreasonable. After all, reciprocity, like equality, is in itself a formal
principle; it gets “bite” only when filled with particular substantive
content. Reciprocity can be extended or denied, that is, on the basis of
all sorts of substantive terms: it is as much a manifestation of reciprocity
128. CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 191, 201–02.
129. STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 194, 68 (1999).
130. Id. at 195; cf. OWEN, supra note 90, at 113 (“[T]he capacity of people to come
to an agreement despite their supposedly profound differences is not so amazing, since
Rawls has from the outset included as parties to the discussion only those liberals who
do not differ on the crucial political question at issue.”).
131. See, e.g., RAWLS, PL, supra note 70, at 49–50.
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to let everyone participate in the discussion so long as they accept a
generally theistic framework—basically the eighteenth century view—as
it is to let everyone participate in the discussion so long as they do not
employ a theistic framework, which is roughly the view taken by many
secular liberals today. Thus, no one need have any quarrel with the idea
of reciprocity in itself. And indeed, where are the scholars or citizens
who proclaim themselves opposed to reciprocity as a value? In reality,
disputes are always about what substance to pour into that congenial
vessel, and the accusation that some person or group is unwilling to
accept the criterion of reciprocity will virtually always be a veiled way
of saying that the accused is unwilling to accept the substantive terms
that the accuser would want to be (reciprocally) respected.
More specifically, the modern partisans of Enlightenment want
reciprocity on what they deem reasonable terms. But in this way we end
up with a circularity: a person is said to be unreasonable because he
disrespects the requirement of reciprocity, but to say that he disrespects
the requirement of reciprocity turns out to be just a way of saying that he
is not being reasonable. Hence, reciprocity adds nothing (except
beguiling packaging) to the judgment of reasonableness.
To be sure, partisans of the modern Enlightenment may argue that in
excluding unreasonable persons and views from disturbing the
overlapping consensus, they are merely invoking a legitimate and
necessary qualification—and one that Enlightenment thinkers have
always invoked. It is true—isn’t it?—that the process and products of
reason will be recognizable only to reasonable people? Moreover, even
during the historical Enlightenment, ostensible appeals to consensus—or
to the judgment of all mankind (as in the Declaration of
Independence)—were tacitly understood to be much more limited in
their intended audience: reason was, as noted, mostly a pastime for
“gentlemen of generous education and large views.”132 Nonetheless, two
important differences separate the modern invocation of seemingly
spurious consensuses from the eighteenth-century practice.
First, the exclusion of persons from the “reasonableness” category
seems more conspicuous today—and more conspicuously arbitrary. In
the eighteenth century, the class of “gentlemen of generous education”
might well have been at least roughly coextensive with the class of
people who enjoyed the franchise and a significant degree of literacy.
Today, by contrast, the masses of people excluded for various purposes
from the category of the reasonable would encompass thousands or even
millions of citizens who function successfully in life (often in professions
requiring intelligence and training), who have some education, even
132.
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considerable education, and who are eligible to vote and hold public
office.133 In this context, it is hard to understand the label “unreasonable” to
mean anything other than “in unacceptable disagreement with me.”
Second, the function of consensus in modern thinking is in fact quite
different than it was for the classical Enlightenment—and thus not
amenable to the same sorts of restrictions. In the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, as discussed, consensus was a criterion of and a
means to truth—much as the requirement of mutual verifiability
continues to be in science. If a proposition is true, it was supposed, then
through reason all competent and honest people should in principle be
able to apprehend its truth. And a moral or political proposition could be
true, or false, because there was thought to be a Truth, or a “Nature,”
that the proposition could correctly or incorrectly represent—in the same
way that a proposition in physics or chemistry (about the movements of
particles, or about cold fusion) can be true or false because there is a
material reality that the proposition may or may not represent correctly.
Thus, if for Jefferson “[t]he word ‘right’ was always a signpost pointing
back to the divine plan of the Creation,”134 a proposition about rights
would be true if it correctly represented that plan—false if it did not. On
this understanding, it made sense—in principle, anyway—to count the
opinions of those who might have some presumptive competence to
grasp the objective Truth or Nature that was at issue, and to disregard the
opinions of anyone who lacked such ability.
By contrast, in modern Enlightenment thought, consensus serves no
similar function. Though modern partisans of Enlightenment may
eschew the label of relativist and claim to believe in moral objectivity,
their descriptions of the nature of that objectivity tend to be
excruciatingly coy. Moral judgments may be said to be objectively true
in some elusive sense, but they are surely not taken to be reports about
anything “out there,” or about “the fabric of the moral universe,”135 in
133. For example, Rawls’s famous abortion footnote, in which he peremptorily
pronounces “to that extent unreasonable” any doctrine (and presumably any person
embracing such a doctrine) that would restrict abortion beyond approximately the
trimester framework of Roe v. Wade, would surely exclude millions of Americans for
purposes of that issue. See RAWLS, PL, supra note 70, at 243 n.32. For some less than
lucid (to me, at least) backtracking, see RAWLS, Public Reason, supra note 70, at 169
n.80.
134. BOORSTIN, supra note 58, at 194.
135. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 87, 99, 105 (1996).
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the way they were for the eighteenth century. So it is not clear just what
sort of objective reality or Truth a moral or political-moral claim would
be about, or would represent. And indeed, as noticed already,
contemporary theorists describe the value of consensus not in terms of a
test of truth, but rather in terms of political and social values such as
fairness, civility, and cooperation.
But when consensus is understood in this light, then the eighteenthcentury justification for regarding the opinions of a select class
disappears. Conversely, those whose opinions do not count are excluded
not because they lack the capacity to perceive the Truth—which in any
case is not a proper subject for public discourse—but rather, more
directly and bluntly, because their opinions fall outside the overlapping
consensus on which the excluders would prefer to build their political
community.
It is as if a group calling itself the “Astronomy Society” gradually lost
all interest in the stars but continued, largely for social or solidarity
purposes, to hold conventions to collect and admire old telescopes that
they find aesthetically appealing; and the group excludes particular
telescopes (and their owners) from these conferences not because the
telescopes do not work, but because they are aesthetically unappealing.
In short, telescopes continue to serve a function, but it is nothing like the
same function for which they were originally developed; consequently,
the rationale and criteria for approving some telescopes and
disapproving others are wholly different than those that initially guided
the society. By the same token, consensus is prized in contemporary
liberal thought for its political, not its philosophical or epistemic value.
In this context, to say that a person, or moral or philosophical view, will
not be counted because the person or view is “unreasonable” is
tantamount to saying not that the person lacks some epistemic capacity
or that the view is false—False relative to what? What would that
judgment even mean?—but rather that the person or view is offensive to
the group that is running the discussion. In this way, the modern
Enlightenment lapses into a sort of high-toned neo-tribalism.
The inversion of freedom of expression. The classical Enlightenment,
as we noticed earlier, was inclined to be friendly to the idea of freedom
of expression. The modern Enlightenment is more ambiguous on this
point. On the one hand, modern partisans of Enlightenment maintain the
legacy of opposition to familiar or conventional forms of censorship.136
Not only is such opposition a prominent part of the Enlightenment
136. Rawls, for example, rehearses and reaffirms the standard received doctrines
and decisions protecting freedom of speech and press. RAWLS, PL, supra note 70, at
340–56.
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legacy; the modern heirs of that legacy may sense that traditional
censorship is based on moralistic or religious rationales that should be
relegated to the private sphere in any case. So it is natural for proponents of
the modern ideal to favor freedom of expression in these familiar
contexts.137
In a less overt but arguably more important way, however, the modern
Enlightenment has a strongly censorial cast. We have already noticed
how the modern ideal of public reason attempts in varying degrees to
cleanse public discourse of the explicit invocation of religion or other
comprehensive views. Critics of such restrictions plausibly see them as
an effort to suppress expression—and in the area that has typically been
regarded as the core First Amendment concern (that is, political speech).
The public reason of the modern Enlightenment thus stands as a censor
looming over public discussion.
Consider, for example, Rawls’s analysis of the vexed issues of sexual
conduct and same-sex marriage.138 In popular, public, and academic
debate, these issues currently generate wide-ranging discussion
addressing a broad spectrum of legal, moral, psychological, sociological,
and even theological concerns. But in a debate governed by the
constraints of public reason, much of this discussion would be ruled out
of bounds. “[T]he government would appear to have no interest in the
particular form of family life, or of relations among the sexes,” Rawls
matter-of-factly remarks, “except insofar as that form or those relations
in some way affect the orderly reproduction of society over time.”139
Much of what people currently argue about and, it seems, care about, is
accordingly decreed irrelevant to legal and political concerns. In
particular, many of the familiar arguments that appeal to moral values or
religious convictions would be deemed inadmissible, not because the
arguments are false—as to that public reason has nothing to say—but
because they “reflect religious or comprehensive moral doctrines.”140
137. In newer, less familiar contexts, the inheritance may speak less clearly, and
may also pose conflicts between expression and other Enlightened values such as
equality. Hence, issues involving, for instance, “hate speech” or pornography that
arguably promotes the subordination of women may leave the partisans of
Enlightenment uncertain and divided.
138. RAWLS, Public Reason, supra note 70, at 147.
139. Id.
140. Id. Rawls allows, though, that other values beyond the reproduction of society
might be admissible for consideration, including “the equality of women” and the needs
of children. Id.
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The discussion thus becomes much simpler and the proper conclusions
far easier to reach: that is because much of the current debate has been
censored to meet the standards of public reason.
To be sure, liberal theorists usually do not extend the constraints of
public reason to all public discussion (though if public reason could
actually work as advertised it is puzzling why its beneficent jurisdiction
should be confined). Rawls, for instance, insists that decisions be made
on the basis of public reason only with regard to “constitutional
essentials and questions of basic justice”;141 he is ambivalent about
extending similar constraints to less vital political issues.142 Not
surprisingly (but perhaps ironically), Rawls’s supporters tend to
emphasize the very limited coverage of the idea of public reason.143
Even where the constraints are in force, moreover, Rawls would not
necessarily forbid the expression of views that do not meet the demands
of public reason: citizens would be permitted (and sometimes even
encouraged) to air their nonconforming views so long as—Rawls calls
this “the proviso”—“in due course public reasons . . . are presented
sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are
introduced to support.”144 These indulgences do little to moderate the
censorial force of public reason: they amount to telling citizens that on
the most important public issues it is permissible to express views about
religion, or Truth, only on the condition that the final decision does not
depend on those views—which seems tantamount to saying that people
can express their nonconforming views so long as those views make no
difference to the actual outcome of the debate.145
141. RAWLS, PL, supra note 70, at 215.
142. Compare RAWLS, Public Reason, supra note 70, at 134 (“The idea of public
reason does not apply to the background culture with its many forms of non-public
reason nor to media of any kind.”) with RAWLS, PL, supra note 70, at 215.
[M]y aim is to consider first the strongest case where the political questions
concern the most fundamental matters. . . . Should [the limits of public reason]
hold here, we can then proceed to other cases. Still, I grant that it is usually
highly desirable to settle political questions by invoking the values of public
reason.
Id.
143. See, e.g., Philip L. Quinn, Religious Citizens Within the Limits of Public
Reason, 78 THE MOD. SCHOOLMAN 105, 107, 117 (2001).
144. RAWLS, PL, supra note 70, at li–lii.
145. I acknowledge, however, that Rawls’s explanation on this point seems less
than clear, and hence might be interpreted more leniently. For example, the requirement
that a nonconforming argument be supported by “public reasons” that are “sufficient”
conceivably might be understood to impose only something like constitutional law’s
traditional, very minimal “rational basis” requirement; in that case, both the
restrictiveness and the significance of the “public reason” ideal would be drastically
diluted. There seems no way to know. Cf. RAWLS, Public Reason, supra note 70, at 153
(“Yet the details about how to satisfy this proviso must be worked out in practice and
cannot feasibly be governed by a clear family of rules given in advance.”).
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Indeed, Rawls himself concedes that if the constraints of public reason
were legally enforced they would be “incompatible with freedom of
speech.”146 He attempts to deflect concern by explaining that the
constraints will be backed only by a “moral duty.”147 As John Stuart
Mill emphasized, however, social or cultural constraints can be as
inhibiting to freedom of expression as legal restrictions are;148 and the
modern partisans of Enlightenment ardently cultivate those kinds of
constraints.149 Moreover, it is misleading to suggest that the censorship
promoted by the modern Enlightenment ideal is not legally enforced.
The legal sanction typically consists not of criminal punishment, but
rather of judicial invalidation of measures thought to have been adopted
on the basis of nonconforming grounds. As we have seen, that sort of
sanction is very much (if very haphazardly) in force—most obviously in
the establishment clause context. Citizens who would introduce
disfavored rationales into public debate are put on notice, in effect, that
by doing so they risk invalidation of the measures they favor.
More generally, the modern institution of judicial review based on the
assumption that laws and government actions are valid only if based on,
and defensible in terms of, secular and instrumental justifications is itself
a sort of overweening censor over public deliberation. Robert Nagel has
explored this aspect of modern constitutionalism. The rationalism of
modern constitutional law “tends to denigrate important values and to

146. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 70, at 136.
147. Id. Once again, supporters emphasize this limit. See Quinn, supra note 143, at
120.
148. Protection . . . against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there
needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling,
against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties,
its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from
them; to fetter the development and, if possible, prevent the formation of any
individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to
fashion themselves upon the model of its own.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 7 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956) (1859).
149. For instance, Rawls calls for the inculcation of an “ideal” of public reason—he
distinguishes this from the “idea” of public reason—in citizens, who will be encouraged
to think of themselves “as if” they were legislators subject to the constraints of public
reason. RAWLS, Public Reason, supra note 70, at 135. Jeffrie Murphy points out that in
the Rawlsian scheme, citizens who resist the constraints of public reason “are not to be
coerced, but they are legitimately to be criticized—perhaps even made to feel bad or
shunned—in short, to be made the object of social but not legal pressure.” Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Religious Conviction and Political Advocacy (A Commentary on Quinn), 78
THE MOD. SCHOOLMAN 125, 127 (2001).
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stunt moral and political discourse,” Nagel argues.150 In particular,
“courts often operate under the assumption that beliefs that originate in
tradition . . . are impermissible bases for public policy, unless they can
be justified by some rational standard extrinsic to the tradition.”151
Consequently, “the felt interests of those who hold affection for tradition
are systematically (although, of course, not always) slighted.”152 And
the prevailing rationalism tends to discount and filter out the views of
those constituencies, arguably comprising much of society, that are not
given to formulating rationalist or theoretical articulations of their
beliefs.153
More specifically, Nagel painstakingly explains how the Supreme
Court has directly either acted as a censor or supported other
government censors in areas such as sex-specific advertising, abortion,
and racial integration: “not only does the Supreme Court sometimes
permit agencies to censor information for purposes of mind control but
also in important areas the Court itself acts as the censor.”154 And in a
subtle but pervasive way, he argues, the very proclivity of Americans to
look to courts for the resolution of so many difficult controversies—and
the willingness of courts to provide and impose such resolutions—reflects a
sort of self-censorial impulse.
[T]he Court not only occasionally exemplifies our inclinations toward mind
control but also in a larger sense embodies our need to escape ourselves. The
degree to which in modern times we increasingly and unshakably are dependent
on this institution is a sign of how much we want to censor ourselves.155

In sum, the modern Enlightenment for the most part retains the
specific inherited commitments to freedom of expression; but its more
vital impulse, most clearly reflected in its descriptions of public reason
in terms of large bodies of belief that should be discouraged or excluded
from public discourse, has a strongly censorial character. And this
censorial bent is entirely consonant with the central logic of the modern
Enlightenment. The classical Enlightenment, as we have seen, was
motivated by a desire to live in accordance with Truth and by a
confidence (perhaps reflecting the prevailing providential worldview)
that discussion would naturally lead human beings in the direction of
Truth. Having effectively abandoned those premises and reoriented the
political task toward civility and cooperation, the modern Enlightenment
150.
151.
152.
153.
(1994).
154.
155.

1300

NAGEL, supra note 98, at 111–12.
Id. at 116–17.
Id. at 117.
ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER
Id. at 110. See generally id. at 103–21.
Id. at 143–44.
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has little reason to be enthused about the specific practical commitment
to free expression.
There is nothing surprising about this conclusion. Children have long
been taught that it is bad manners to talk about religion or other
potentially controversial subjects in certain kinds of society. Where the
goal is cooperation and civil peace, potentially inflammatory subjects are
best left alone: People who breach this etiquette are silenced by being
ignored, frowned at, and not invited back. The modern Enlightenment
ideal of public reason represents the political elaboration of this
conventional—and censorial—wisdom.
The exhaustion of Enlightenment culture? Starting out as an effort to
break free of culture and tradition, the Enlightenment has itself become a
tradition: thus, scholars talk easily of “Enlightenment culture” or “the
Enlightenment tradition.”156 Though this development might be thought
to constitute a self-contradiction, the development was also unavoidable;
and it would be harsh to take the modern Enlightenment too much to
task for succumbing to the inevitable. As noted earlier, it seems more
charitable to interpret the classic distinction between reason and culture
not as asserting a strong and philosophical (but also untenable)
dichotomy, but rather as expressing a sense that the particular culture
within which Descartes and his successors lived had become exhausted
and inauthentic—unable to support genuine, meaningful discourse or to
command sincere assent. In the culture in which a founder of the
Enlightenment such as Descartes lived, most people were no doubt
working away in relative content: lawyers and scholars and theologians
and politicians were writing, debating, expounding, drawing
conclusions—just as their descendants are today. At the same time, it
seems there must have been an underlying sense, felt by some, that the
discourse was not working as it should, or as it once had. As discussed,
Stephen Toulmin has described the easy-going, moderately skeptical
mindset of the period that many may have found attractive—and that
Toulmin himself recommends—but that was deeply unsatisfying to
someone like Descartes, with his pressing demand for truth.
156. See, e.g., Thomas Fleiner, Comparative Constitutional and Administrative
Law, 75 TUL. L. REV. 929, 939 (2001) (referring to “enlightenment culture”); Rosemary
J. Coombe, Critical Cultural Legal Studies, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 463, 471 (1998)
(referring to “Enlightenment traditions”); Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really
Needs to Know It Learned from the Warren Court, 50 VAND. L. REV. 459, 481 (1997)
(referring to “the Enlightenment tradition”).
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Does the culture of today in which lawyers and scholars—and
citizens—live display similar characteristics of exhaustion?157 We can
see in the public discourse advocated by modern partisans of
Enlightenment a sort of degenerative dynamic that seems constituted to
render that discourse incapable of speaking to us on any deep level or in
any convincing way.
Start with John Coleman’s observation that “[s]ecular Enlightenment
language remains exceedingly ‘thin’ as a symbol system.”158 This “thin”
quality is not accidental, but rather deliberate; it would be only a slight
exaggeration to say that Enlightenment discourse aspires to thinness. As
discussed above, Enlightenment reason adopts consensus as a working
or operational principle: only premises, beliefs, and modes of argument
and inference generally accepted by reasonable persons independent of
personal idiosyncrasies or cultural particularities can qualify for the label
of “reason.” As a community becomes increasingly pluralistic, the
Enlightenment conception of reason necessarily excludes more and
more, and the material available for reasoning accordingly becomes
increasingly meager.
As the material available for argument and justification becomes
scantier, however, a worrisome prospect appears: What if the discursive
resources available within the domain of secular public reason are
insufficient to resolve a difficult issue, or to provide a satisfying
justification for a decision on such an issue? This worry is hardly
academic. On the contrary, it seems almost inevitable that at least for
highly controversial issues—abortion is only the most obvious—the
limited resources of public reason in a radically pluralistic society will be
incapable of providing a persuasive basis for decision and justification.159
157. For a diagnosis of this situation in law, see STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S
QUANDARY (forthcoming 2004).
158. JOHN A. COLEMAN, AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC THEOLOGY 193 (1982). It is a
symptom of this “thinness,” I think, that even secular theorists sometimes resort to a
religious vocabulary in order to convey their most profound commitments. For instance,
Ronald Dworkin makes pervasive use of the language of the “sacred” in trying to explain
the value of human life. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 68–101 (1994). But, as
Michael Perry argues, Dworkin cannot give any satisfying secular account vindicating
this usage; rather, it seems that Dworkin is “trading on the greater strength of the
objective sense in which the word is ordinarily used” in order to underscore a
commitment that a secular vocabulary is too weak to convey. PERRY, supra note 100, at
25–29. See also Pojman, supra note 101, at 287 (“[O]ne must wonder at the sacerdotal
language used [by Gregory Vlastos] of human beings: ‘sacred,’ of ‘infinite value,’
‘inviolability,’ and so forth. The religious tone is not accidental, but the lack of
reference to religion is a serious omission.”).
159. Rawls attempts to avoid this problem by stipulating that an “essential feature
of public reason is that its political conceptions should be complete,” meaning that it is
adequate to “give a reasonable answer to all, or to nearly all, questions involving
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.” RAWLS, Public Reason, supra note
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In this predicament, the community would face an unappealing set of
alternatives. Lacking any adequate basis in reason to make a decision,
the community might simply be paralyzed—unable to decide or act. Or,
more realistically, the community might make a decision anyway—by
smuggling in considerations that do not enjoy the support of any consensus
and that cannot plausibly be presented as part of a justification limited to
public reason. Rawls purports to forbid this course, but instead suggests
that “when there seems to be a stand-off, that is, when . . . arguments
seem evenly balanced on both sides, . . . citizens must vote for the
ordering of political values they sincerely think the most reasonable.”160
So put, this imperative is akin to a recommendation that says that if you
have to choose between what look to be two equally sized pieces of pie,
pick the piece that looks bigger.
Realistically, therefore, smuggling is inevitable. And we can readily
imagine the consequences. As such smuggling becomes a common
practice, it will be hard to conceal from the active, street-wise
participants in the discourse. They will come to understand that public
debate often does not explicitly set forth the real reasons that in fact
motivate the parties to the debate, and that public justifications often fail
to present the considerations that in reality determined the decisions for
which the justifications are being offered. Everyone is keeping his or
her cards hidden, so to speak. Thus, a climate of suspicion will come to
pervade the discourse. Moreover, the more generic reasons given for a
decision will often be so palpably unpersuasive that it will be natural for
those who oppose a particular decision to regard the justification as
spurious and disingenuous—as virtually no justification at all. The
decision will thus come to have a “because I said so” quality. In this
way, what began as (and what may still advertise itself as) an enterprise
in governance on the basis of reasoning from and toward mutually
acceptable commitments will become—or at least will appear to many of
those affected to be—the disingenuous exercise of raw power.161
We can appreciate this dynamic by reference to one of the most
70, at 144–45. A discourse lacking such completeness, it seems, would not qualify as a
form of public reason. This stipulation does nothing to address the problem, however,
but merely prompts a reformulation of the objection: not “[p]ublic reason will leave
many questions unanswered,” but rather “[p]ublic reason (so defined) does not exist.”
160. RAWLS, Public Reason, supra note 70, at 168 (emphasis added).
161. Cf. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 71 (2d ed. 1984) (describing
modern moral discourse as “a rhetoric which serves to conceal behind the masks of
morality what are in fact the preferences of arbitrary will and desire”).
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thoughtful and balanced treatments of public discourse.
Kent
Greenawalt’s work on the subject is characterized both by a commitment
to public reason and liberal constitutional values and by an appreciation
of the importance of religion in the lives of many citizens.162 In an early
book on the subject, he astutely pointed out that the complacent
assumption that all citizens ought to be able to bracket their religious
convictions and deliberate for public purposes on rational, secular
grounds misconceives the way religion works in the lives of many
citizens. And he showed that at least some important issues cannot be
settled purely on the basis of rational or “publicly accessible” grounds.163
Greenawalt has consistently sought a moderate or compromise position
which would not exclude religious citizens from participation in public
life but which would also adhere to the ideal of a nonsectarian and
generally accessible public reason.
In his effort to find such a middle ground, Greenawalt has argued that
in many contexts it is appropriate for participants to rely on their
religious convictions in making political decisions but that these
convictions should not be openly expressed in public discussion or
justification. Instead, the arguments or justifications should be presented
in more generic terms: not “God requires . . . ,” but rather “The public
good is best served by . . . .” This translation of religious beliefs into the
secular language of public reason will be less offensive to nonbelievers,
and Greenawalt argues—persuasively—that the translation is not
dishonest; it is only less revealing of the full reasons for the position
taken. Incomplete disclosure is not equivalent to misrepresentation.164
There are surely contexts in which the strategy recommended by
Greenawalt is appropriate, perhaps even ethically required.165 Notice,
though, that incomplete disclosure has its own costs, which may be
debilitating over the course of time. Suppose that on difficult issues and
for the laudable purposes that influence Greenawalt, I routinely provide
you with generic justifications for my positions—justifications that,
though honest as far as they go, deliberately decline to reveal the deeper
reasons for my views and actions. And suppose you do the same with
me. Over time we will surely come to understand that we are both
engaged in this common practice. What will this understanding do to
162. See generally KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL
CHOICE (1988).
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS
137–40, 163–64 (1995).
165. I have discussed this point (and Greenawalt’s effort to find a moderate
position) at greater length, and favorably, in Steven D. Smith, Augustinian Liberal, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1673 (1999).

1304

SMITH S..DOC

[VOL. 41: 1263, 2004]

8/22/2019 1:27 PM

Recovering (From) Enlightenment?
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the quality of our mutual conversation?
Well, in the first place, our discussion can hardly be a very profound
or satisfactory exercise of reason. How could it be, when the decisive
grounds for our views and actions are not exposed for examination? We
will be engaged more in trading conclusions—or at best mid-level and
largely conclusory premises—than in examining our deepest convictions
and commitments. Further, while our generic strategy may help us to
“just get along” in the short run, it is unlikely to lead to any deep rapport
or mutual understanding. So long as we stick to this strategy, we will
not really get to know each other.
Worse than that, our strategy is likely to breed mutual suspicion. You
tell me that you favor political decision X for (generic) reason Y, but I
understand that you are not disclosing what is actually the decisive
consideration—and that if you did, I would almost surely not accept it.
(You understand that I would not accept it, and I understand that you
understand this; otherwise you would have incentive to disclose it, and
no reason not to disclose it). For all I know, your generic reason may be
concealing—from me, and perhaps from yourself as well—what is
actually a self-serving motive. It may well be that in purporting to give
me reasons, you are in reality merely trying to manipulate me—to
exercise power over me. The pretense of reason may be merely an
exercise of the “will to power.”
I have been speaking speculatively and hypothetically of a dynamic
whereby the modern Enlightenment conception of reason and the kind of
discussion it prescribes might deteriorate into a thin discourse of
suspicion, manipulation, and willfulness. Does this hypothetical
description have any application to the public discourse, and in
particular the constitutional discourse, that prevails in the United States
today? The evidence is overwhelming that it does, I think, but for present
purposes I will merely cite as examples two respected constitutional
scholars, who speak with specific reference to the justifications given in
constitutional decisions. H. Jefferson Powell contends that American
constitutional discourse is “incoherent rationally” and hence is not so
much an expression of reason as a manifestation of “violence [that] is
increasingly wayward, increasingly brutal.”166 “[C]onstitutionalism,”
Powell asserts, “is one of the most seductive masks worn by state
166. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
262 (1993).
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violence.”167 More recently, Anthony Amsterdam (along with many
other critics, of course) caustically condemns the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bush v. Gore,168 calling it an instance of “sickening hypocrisy
and insincere constitutional posturing”; but the decision, Amsterdam
goes on, is not distinctive but merely especially brazen in these respects.169
“[T]he court finally has revealed unmistakably what it does all the time
and usually gets away with: masking result-driven, political, unprincipled
decisions in the guise of obedience to rules of law which the justices feel
completely free to twist and retwist to suit their purposes.”170
These pronouncements may seem hyperbolic or even, in Amsterdam’s
case, almost hysterical. But if the analysis given earlier is correct, the
suspicion these statements exude is precisely the attitude that the
degenerative dynamic of Enlightenment discourse—of public reason—seems
destined to produce.
The problem was diagnosed almost half a century ago by John
Courtney Murray. “As we discourse on public affairs,” Murray argued,
“on the affairs of the commonwealth . . . we inevitably have to move
upward, as it were, into realms of some theoretical generality—into
metaphysics, ethics, theology.”171 But of course these are precisely the
realms that the modern Enlightenment, as exemplified by thinkers like
Rawls, excludes from the jurisdiction of public reason—because no
overlapping consensus is likely to obtain there. The result, however, is
not a genuine consensus, but simply an impoverishment of the public
domain. In the public conversation fostered by the modern Enlightenment,
Murray perceived “a climate of doubt and bewilderment in which clarity
about the larger aims of life is dimmed and the self-confidence of the
people is destroyed, so that finally what you have is . . . impotent
nihilism.”172 The irony is that this loss of content is not in fact
compensated for by any gain in genuine consensus or civility.
The fact is that among us civility—or civic unity or civic amity, as you will—is
a thing of the surface. It is quite easy to break through it. . . .
....
. . . There is not simply an exchange of arguments but of verbal blows. You
do not have to probe deeply beneath the surface of civic amity to uncover the
structure of passion and war.173

167. Id. at 47.
168. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
169. Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Law Is Left Slowly Twisting in the Wind, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at M5.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 13, at 15.
172. Id. at 12.
173. Id. at 18–19.
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III. RENEWING THE ENLIGHTENMENT?
The preceding discussion has suggested that although the modern
Enlightenment retains—rhetorically, at least—a commitment to
governance in accordance with reason, this commitment has been
transformed into almost the opposite of what it meant in the period
leading up to and including the American founding. The eighteenthcentury providential worldview that furnished the framework for
reasoning has been abandoned, at least for purposes of public and
academic discourse. The imperative to live according to Truth has been
radically amended to become an admonition against bringing Truth into
public discourse. And the predictable result has been the development
of a public discourse that seems increasingly exhausted and
inauthentic—unable to address our real questions and concerns or to
generate genuine conviction.174 In short, modern Enlightenment culture
seems very much like the complacent, moderate, skeptical culture
against which the classical Enlightenment rebelled. And it appears to
suffer from the very condition that, according to Stephen Toulmin,
provoked the development of the Enlightenment project by thinkers such
as Descartes—a “crisis of belief.”175
So the question arises: Might we not be in need of a new
Enlightenment—one that would challenge the current intellectual culture
in the same way that the classical Enlightenment challenged the culture
it inherited from the Middle Ages and early modernity? Is the modern
Enlightenment ideal—an ideal promoted in various forms by so many
mainstream thinkers and scholars—ripe to be enlightened by a renewed
commitment to finding and living by truth, or by Truth?
Perhaps, but there are difficulties. Most obviously, it is difficult to
174. Cf. Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 40 (1993–94)
(observing a “crisis of legitimacy in constitutional thought in which the generally
accepted paradigms and modes of thought are no longer felt capable of yielding
convincing solutions to constitutional questions”). For a collection of similar judgments
by scholars from across the political and jurisprudential spectrum, see SMITH, REASON,
supra note 9, at 125–26.
175. TOULMIN, supra note 21, at 45. For recent expressions of this assessment of
contemporary culture, see HUSTON SMITH, WHY RELIGION MATTERS: THE FATE OF THE
HUMAN SPIRIT IN AN AGE OF DISBELIEF (2001); GREGG EASTERBROOK, BESIDE STILL
WATERS: SEARCHING FOR MEANING IN AN AGE OF DOUBT (1998). I have argued
elsewhere that American legal thought over the last century presents a scene of
jurisprudential stagnation reflecting a similar crisis in belief. Steven D. Smith, Believing
Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041, 1043–47 (1999).
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know where the course of trying to live by Truth would lead us today.
Would we end up with “natural law,” perhaps, or with the naked
nihilism of a brutally honest Social Darwinism? With Plato, or with
Thrasymachus? Fear of the something like the latter alternative is
perhaps the principal bulwark sustaining the modern Enlightenment
ideal even though it is no longer the carrier of belief and hope that it was
two centuries ago.
In addition, the parallel to the origins of the historical Enlightenment
is inexact. To be sure, the culture of modern liberal democracy bears
many resemblances to the complacent, moderately skeptical intellectual
culture of the late sixteenth century against which, at least in Toulmin’s
interpretation, the historical Enlightenment was a reaction. But that
reaction, Toulmin says, grew out of more than intellectual dissatisfaction
with a prevailing nonchalant attitude towards truth: the prevalent attitude
was associated as well with social breakdown, and in particular with an
inability to curb the destruction being wrought by religious warfare.
Today, by contrast, America enjoys relatively high levels of material
prosperity and an absence of conspicuous religious or social strife.
There is, to be sure, a “culture war” that implicates the passionate
concerns of many Americans;176 still, that struggle is not at this point a
source of massive violence and destruction in the way the wars over
religion were in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
In short, conditions in America (and in particular for the academic
elite, at least in their material circumstances) are relatively comfortable
at the moment,177 and comfort is compatible with complacency—towards,
among other things, concerns such as “truth.” Mill notwithstanding, it is
usually easier, if less heroic, to be a pig satisfied than Socrates
dissatisfied.
To be sure, the present comfortableness may be thin and also
transitory. Some observers see in our current situation signs of moral
and cultural decay.178 In a similar vein, Robert Nagel senses just below
the cheerful surface of American culture “a brooding fear of potential
disaster,” and he sees the modern dependence on judicial review as a
“recurring manifestation of . . . self-doubt.”179 He may be right. But as
176. See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA (1991).
177. This conclusion was written before September 11, 2001. I think it is too early
to tell whether the description needs to be changed in light of more recent events.
178. See, e.g., GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE DE-MORALIZATION OF SOCIETY 221–57
(1995) (asserting that statistics indicate a downward moral and social trend that bodes
even worse for the future than for the present); HOSLE, supra note 122, at 41 (asserting
that “we are manifestly living in a time of moral, political, artistic, and intellectual
decay”).
179. NAGEL, supra note 153, at 142, 156.
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Nagel himself argues, this anxiety has in recent decades prompted not
honest self-scrutiny or an effort to rethink or return to fundamental
truths, but rather a pattern of denial: more energetic “self-deception in a
culture already afraid that it is too dependent on euphemism and
evasion.”180
There is a second and perhaps even more important gap in the
historical parallel. The intellectual culture of the late Middle Ages and
early modernity was strikingly unlike modern Enlightenment culture in
at least one crucial respect: it never renounced a concern for truth. On
the contrary, the intellectual achievements of the Middle Ages grew out
of a massive effort to articulate, and to build a society upon, an
overarching truth.181 Later thinkers such as Montaigne may have
harbored greater doubts about the scope of human understanding, as
Toulmin argues, but they did not disavow the commitment to finding
and living by as much truth as was attainable. So in trying to redirect
life toward a greater conformity with truth, the classical Enlightenment
was building on a commitment that was already in place.
By contrast, modern Enlightenment culture, as discussed above, is
characterized by a self-conscious effort to distance at least public
discourse from the larger questions of truth, or from the whole truth; and
this effort is reinforced by post-modern squeamishness about the
vocabulary and the very possibility of truth, and especially of Truth. In
this setting, one can imagine a confrontation in which a revivified but
disconcerted Descartes complains that the prevailing modern discourse
in the public realm has lost its connection and commitment to truth. A
Rawls might respond, “Excellent! That’s what we’ve been working
for,” while a yawning Rorty might remark, “This sort of talk about
‘truth’ bores me. Can’t we please discuss something else?”182
Prognosis is always hazardous, to be sure, but a renewed commitment
to truth—in constitutional discourse, in public deliberation generally—does
180. Id. at 155.
181. The very first chapter of the Summa Contra Gentiles asserts that “[t]ruth must
consequently be the ultimate end of the whole universe, and the consideration of the wise
man aims principally at truth.” St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles 60 Bk. I,
ch. 1 (Anton C. Pegis trans., 1975 ed.).
182. Asserting that “truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a
philosophically interesting theory about,” Rorty explains that when pragmatists like
himself “suggest that we not ask questions about the nature of Truth and Goodness, they
do not . . . have a ‘relativistic’ or ‘subjectivist’ theory of Truth or Goodness. They would
simply like to change the subject.” RORTY, supra note 14, at xiii–xiv.
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not seem imminent. It appears that for the time being, we may have no
alternative except to hunker down for what looks to be a long, dark night
of Enlightenment.
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